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1. Introduction
A central tenet of trade theory is that lowering trade barriers increases welfare. Trade
agreements between countries lower trade barriers on imported goods and provide welfare gains
to consumers from increases in variety, access to better-quality products and lower prices. While
a large literature estimates the overall gains from trade, less is known about the effects of
specific trade agreements and the channels through which they increase welfare. We estimate
the impact of trade agreements on consumer welfare through the channels of increased variety,
better quality and lower prices, using the new generation of agreements implemented by the
European Union (EU12) between 1993 and 2013.1
The paper makes two main contributions. The first contribution is to decompose the welfare
impact of the EU's trade agreements on EU consumers into gains from new varieties, better
quality and lower prices to explain which channel dominates the realization of gains from trade
agreements. This is important because quality is not directly observable in standard trade
data, and unit values (obtained from dividing revenues by quantities) confound increases in
true prices and quality. If quality increases after the implementation of a trade agreement,
interpreting unit values as true prices would imply an increase in the import price index. If
unit values are instead interpreted as pure quality then we would over-estimate the impact of
trade agreements on quality. Trade agreements are likely to have both price and quality effects,
so that their welfare impact would be under-estimated when quality rises and prices fall.2
To disentangle these different welfare effects, we build on recent work that measures quality
as a residual from data on import quantities and prices (e.g., Khandelwal et al. 2013). Building
on this literature, we make the standard assumption that consumers have constant elasticities of
substitution across differentiated varieties of products. This restricts the pro-competitive effects
of trade, but enables us to use bilateral trade data to infer quality based on these elasticities,
which we estimate extending Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006) to include an
improved treatment of measurement error in observed prices.
Having inferred quality, we estimate the impact of trade agreements on prices, quality and
variety using a difference-in-difference strategy that exploits the timing and geographic variation
in the EU's trade policy. We find that for the EU as a whole access to better-quality products is
the primary contributor to welfare gains from trade agreements. Joining a free trade agreement
1Here and in the following, we use the term European Union (or EU12 or simply EU) to refer to the twelve
member states prior to the 1995 enlargement (Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Spain). This geographic focus was chosen to
keep the set of countries for our analysis constant over the sample period.
2While price and quality changes are substantively similar on the demand side of standard trade models, the
decomposition of welfare gains into prices, quality and variety is of interest for supply reasons because firms
might differ in their ability to reduce prices, upgrade quality and expand variety (Dhingra 2013).
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increases the quality of products from the trade partner by 7% on average. This finding is
robust to controlling for other determinants of quality such as per-capita income and we find
no evidence of a potential endogeneity of the EU's trade agreements with respect to pre-trends
in prices or quality.
Our overall results hide a substantial amount of treatment effect heterogeneity across EU
countries, trading partners and types of trade agreements. For example, high-income EU
countries (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium/Luxembourg) saw much
stronger increases in quality than other EU countries. Indeed, for the group of low-income
EU countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal), the impact of trade agreements worked almost
exclusively through a reduction in prices rather than increased quality.
The second contribution of the paper is to show by how much changes in the import price
index affect the consumer price index (CPI). For the EU12 as a whole, the quality-enhancing
effect of trade agreements translates into a cumulative 0.24% CPI reduction between 1993-
2013. Around 55% of this change results from the direct effect of higher-quality imports of
final goods. The remaining 45% is due to reductions in the quality-adjusted price of imports of
intermediate inputs which lowers the prices of domestic goods. While our focus is on the gains
arising from imported goods throughout, we also provide tentative evidence that these gains
were not partially offset by a reduction in the number of domestic varieties. Looking across
EU countries, we find that CPI reductions are strongest for high-income countries (0.41%) and
only 0.12%-0.13% for the remaining EU12 member states.
Our paper is related to the growing literature that estimates the gains from openness (Broda
and Weinstein 2006; Feenstra and Weinstein 2010; Feenstra and Romalis 2012; Hallak and
Schott 2011; Amiti and Khandelwal 2013; Demir 2011). In their classic paper, Broda and
Weinstein (2006) estimate the gains to the US through the channel of import variety. Blonigen
and Soderbery (2010) address the welfare gains from variety in the auto industry which has
detailed data on varieties. Feenstra and Weinstein (2010) examine both variety and lower
prices from import competition. Feenstra and Romalis (2012) and Hallak and Schott (2011)
make methodological contributions to this literature and provide quality inferences. Hummels
and Klenow (2005) examine the extent to which differences in trade volumes are explained by
differences in quality across countries. They find that within product categories, richer countries
export more units at higher prices to a given market, consistent with producing higher quality.
Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) show that export zeros and export unit values are increasing in
distance and decreasing in importer size, and that this fact can be explained by a quality-
augmented version of a workhorse trade model. Johnson, 2012 estimates a heterogeneous firms
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trade model and finds that prices are increasing in the difficulty of entering a given destination
market in most sectors.
The focus of these studies is on gains from openness and on how variety, quality or prices
vary by trade partner characteristics such as the physical distance between them. We instead
examine the changes in variety, quality and prices resulting from trade agreements. Focusing on
trade agreements has several practical advantages. First, trade agreements are under the direct
control of policy makers, unlike more general measures of openness such as trade-to-GDP ratios
or simply changes over time. Understanding the effects of such agreements is thus more relevant
from a policy perspective than understanding the gains from openness more generally. Second,
bilateral trade agreements have become the preferred form of trade liberalization by the EU and
other developed countries over the past decades and understanding their effects on consumers
is of first-order importance for the design of trade policy. Finally, we can regress price, quality
and variety measures on time- and origin-varying trade agreement variables, allowing us to
disentangle the impact of these agreements from other determinants using standard difference-
in-difference techniques.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the effects of trade agreements (e.g., Baier
and Bergstrand, 2007, 2009; Egger et al., 2008; Head and Mayer, 2014). These papers show
that such agreements usually lead to a strong expansion in trade flows between partners. We
adapt empirical techniques from this literature to identify the impact of trade agreements on
prices, quality and variety. This enables us to compute implied consumer price index changes
which is arguably of more direct relevance to overall welfare gains than the underlying trade
flow changes.3
Finally, our results also mirror the research by Sheu (2014) who uses rich product-level data
on the Indian computer printer industry and finds that quality was the primary source of
welfare gains during the trade liberalization period of 1996-2005. We look at the entire range of
tradable products which enables us to compute implied counterfactual changes in the economy-
wide consumer price index. We also link price index changes more closely to specific trade
policy changes using difference-in-differences regression techniques.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a model of consumer
welfare that enables quality inferences and a decomposition of the consumer price index into
3A few studies have also attempted decompositions of the total effect of trade agreements on trade. For example,
following Hummels and Klenow (2005), Baier et al. (2014) decompose trade flows into an extensive margin of
variety (the weighted count of products of all products exported to a particular destination country) and an
intensive margin of revenues from continuing varieties (the market share of these products in the total imports
of the destination country). They find that both margins of trade are affected by trade agreements, and that the
intensive margin elasticity of trade flows to trade agreements membership is larger than the extensive margin
elasticity.
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prices, quality and variety. Section 3 provides an empirical model to infer quality and estimate
the impact of trade agreements on each channel. Section 4 discusses the data and its sources.
Section 5 presents our empirical results and conducts a number of robustness checks. We
also present the decomposition of the import and consumer price index and derive price index
changes due to FTAs for the EU for the period 1993-2013. Section 6 concludes.
2. A Model of Consumer Welfare
In this section, we build on Broda and Weinstein (2006) to specify consumer demand. We
derive the aggregate price index and the decomposition of price indices into prices, quality and
variety. We use a partial equilibrium framework and initially focus on the direct effect of trade
agreements on final good imports. The advantage of this approach is that it requires relatively
few assumptions, apart from the specification of a demand system and the usual identifying
assumptions of difference-in-difference estimates. However, in the second part of this section
we also look at indirect supply-side impacts working through the cost-reducing effect of cheaper
and better intermediate imports.
2.1. Consumer Demand. The representative consumer's welfare is defined over goods from
S sectors and takes the following CES form:4
U =
(∑S
s=1
U
β−1
β
s
) β
β−1
.
In our data, sectors are defined according to a version of the ISIC classification (13 sectors in
total, see Section 5.4). Welfare in each sector is derived from composite imported and domestic
goods as follows:
(1) Us =
(
M (γs−1)/γss +D
(γs−1)/γs
s
) γs
γs−1 .
We are interested in examining how consumer welfare changes over time with trade policy. The
real income of a representative consumer at time t is Ut = Yt/Pt where Yt is the representative
consumer's total income and Pt is the price index associated with utility function Ut. With
constant consumer income, the welfare change is equal to the economy-wide change in this price
index:
(2) Pt/Pt−1 = ΠSs=1 (Ps,t/Ps,t−1)
ωst ,
4Our choice of preference structure is driven by data availability and comparability to the existing literature.
Since we have data on consumer expenditure and import shares, a nested CES structure is the most flexible
specification possible. In an earlier version of the paper, we used a more restrictive Cobb-Douglas structure
which yielded similar results.
TRADE AGREEMENTS AND CONSUMER WELFARE 6
where the ωst are the Sato-Vartia weights associated with the CES price index.
5 The change in
the sectoral price indices (Ps,t) in turn is given by:
(3)
Ps,t
Ps,t−1
=
(
PsM,t
PsM,t−1
)ωsMt ( PsD,t
PsD,t−1
)ωsDt
,
where PsM,t and PsD,t are the prices of imported and domestic goods, and ωsMt and ωsDt the
Sato-Vartia weights associated with (1).
Trade policy changes affect sectoral price indices through two channels. Directly, by changing
the price, quality or variety of imported goods; and indirectly by affecting the production cost
of domestically produced goods via changes in imported intermediate inputs. We discuss both
channels in turn.
2.2. Import Price Index Change. The imported composite good Ms is a CES aggregate of
products within sector s,
Ms =
(∑
h∈Hs
m
δs−1
δs
h
) δs
δs−1
,
where a product h is defined as a unique 6-digit code of the Harmonized System (HS) product
classification and Hs is the set of HS products associated with sector s. HS 6-digit is the most
disaggregated level at which data on import values and quantities are available in our data.
Each product h is made up of varieties (indexed by z) shipped from different origin countries
(indexed by o):
m
(σh−1)/σh
h =
∑O
o=1
∑noh
z=1
(qoh (z)x
o
h (z))
(σh−1)/σh , σh > 1,
where qoh (z) denotes the quality of product h's variety z imported from origin o, x
o
h (z) are
the units of quantity consumed of that variety, and σh is the elasticity of substitution between
varieties. The number of varieties imported from a given origin country is denoted by noh. Let
poh(z) denote the price of variety z of imported HS 6-digit product h. Then the price index for
the imported composite product mh is:
ph =
[∑O
o=1
∑noh
z=1
(poh (z) /q
o
h (z))
1−σh
] 1
1−σh
,
and the change in the import price index for sector s is
(4) PsM,t/PsM,t−1 = Πh∈Hs (ph,t/ph,t−1)
ωht ,
where ωht are the Sato-Vartia weights associated with the HS products of sector s.
5That is, ωst =
ss,t−ss,t−1
ln ss,t−ln ss,t−1 /
(∑
i∈S
si,t−si,t−1
ln si,t−ln si,t−1
)
, with ss,t being sector s's share in total expenditure. See
Sato (1976) for details.
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Because we have defined products h at the most disaggregated level of data available, we
do not observe prices and quantities of individual varieties imported from country o. To make
progress, we make the standard assumption that varieties are identical within a product-origin
combination:
(5) ph =
[∑O
o=1
noh (p
o
h/q
o
h)
1−σh
] 1
1−σh
,
where noh is the number of hidden varieties of product h imported from country o.
2.3. Decomposition of the Import Price Index. We would like to know the channels 
prices, quality or variety  through which trade agreements change the import price index. To
determine the sources of welfare gains, we use equation (5) to obtain an exact price index.
Diewert (1976) defines an exact price index over a constant set of varieties as the ratio of
price indices across time periods t and t − 1. To use results from the price index literature,
we define the quality- and hidden-variety adjusted price of the HS6 variety from origin o as
po,adjh ≡ poh/
(
(noh)
1/(σh−1) qoh
)
. For a constant set of origin countries, the exact price index for
product h is given by (see Feenstra, 1994, p.158):
ph,t/ph,t−1 = ΠOo=1
(
po,adjh,t /p
o,adj
h,t−1
)ωoht
,
where ωoht are the Sato-Vartia weights associated with each variety. If the set of varieties (i.e.,
origin countries) changes between periods, Feenstra (1994) shows that the exact price index
can be rewritten as:
(6) ph,t/ph,t−1 = (λh,t/λh,t−1)
1/(σh−1) Πo∈I
(
po,adjh,t /p
o,adj
h,t−1
)ωoht
,
where
(7) λhr =
(∑
o∈I
po,adjh,r x
o
h,r
)
/
(∑
o′∈Ir
po
′,adj
h,r x
o′
h,r
)
r = t− 1, t
and I denotes the set of varieties present in both periods, t and t − 1 (and Ir is the set of
varieties present in period r). That is, λht is the share of continuing varieties in all varieties in
period t, and 1− λht is the share of new varieties. Similarly, 1− λht−1 is the share of varieties
exiting between t− 1 and t (expressed as a share of varieties available in t− 1).
Substituting for po,adjh = p
o
h/
(
(noh)
1/(σh−1) qoh
)
in equation (6), the exact price index can be
decomposed into its components of variety, prices, quality, and hidden variety as follows:
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(8)
ph,t
ph,t−1
=
(
λht
λht−1
) 1
σh−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Variety
×Πo∈I
(
noht
noht−1
)− ωoht
σh−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hidden Variety
×Πo∈I
(
poht
poht−1
)ωoht
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prices
×Πo∈I
(
qoht
qoht−1
)−ωoht
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quality
.
Equation (8) enables us to decompose the changes in the price indices arising from each of the
sources of variety, prices and quality.6
Ideally, we would need data on prices, quality and the number of varieties within each HS
6-digit product (noh), as well as on the degree of substitutability across varieties σh to implement
this price index decomposition. Unfortunately, this is infeasible with standard trade data due
to three empirical challenges.
First, as discussed the number of hidden varieties noh is unobservable. While we observe the
total value and volume of trade for each product-origin, we do not know how many different
varieties noh are imported within each product-origin. To overcome this problem, we will use
proxies from the literature to control for hidden varieties in Section 3.
Second, the elasticities of substitution σh determine the importance of different varieties in
the price index but are not directly observed. We will estimate the elasticities for each product
using the structure of the CES demand and invoking assumptions on the supply side.
Finally, quality data is notoriously inadequate for welfare analysis because physical measures
of quality are typically only available for a narrowly defined range of products that constitute
a small share of consumer budgets. We will therefore use the CES demand structure to make
quality inferences for all imported products. We will then estimate the impact of trade agree-
ments on the inferred quality, prices and variety estimates to determine the sources of gains
from trade agreements.
Once we have computed price index changes at the HS 6-digit product level, we can aggre-
gate up to the sector-level import price index change (PsM,t/PsM,t−1) using Sato-Vartia shares
computed from trade data.
2.4. Domestic Price Index Change. The sectoral price index change (3) is also determined
by changes in the domestic price index for sector s, PsD,t/PsD,t−1. By analogy with the import
side, we define a CES aggregator over domestic varieties, with the following associated price
index:
6Note that the variety term captures the overall welfare contribution of new and exiting varieties, including
their prices and quality. For example, if the total number of imported varieties remains constant but exiting
varieties are replaced by higher-quality entering ones, continuing varieties lose market share and the variety
term is smaller than unity. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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PsD,t =
(
Zs∑
z=1
(ps(z)/qs(z))
1−δD
) 1
1−δD
.
Here, qs(z) and ps(z) denote the quality and price of domestic variety z within sector s,
respectively, and δD is the elasticity of substitution between domestic varieties. We do not have
information about the prices or quality of individual domestic firms, nor would it be possible
to convincingly link these to individual trade agreements.7 To make progress, and by analogy
to our assumption about producers of foreign varieties, we assume that domestic firms are
identical. We further assume that product quality and the number of producers is constant
over time.8 With these assumptions, the domestic component of the sectoral price index change
is simply the price change of the representative domestic firm:
PsD,t
PsD,t−1
=
Zs∏
z=1
(
ps,t(z)/qs,t(z)
ps,t−1(z)/qs,t−1(z)
)ωz
=
psD,t
psD,t−1
.
The next step is to specify a production function for domestic firms. Following Blaum et
al. (2015) we assume that a domestic firm z in sector s uses the production technology
ysz = φzl(z)
αsi(z)1−αs , where φ is total factor productivity (TFP), l is a primary factor (e.g.,
labor) and i are intermediates. With perfect pass-through from production costs to prices, this
technology implies price changes of:9
psD,t
psD,t−1
=
φs,t
φs,t−1
(
wt
wt−1
)αs ( PsI,t
PsI,t−1
)1−αs
.
Thus, trade agreements can impact domestic prices through changes in TFP (φ), factor prices
(w) and the cost of intermediate inputs (PI). Given the difficulty of convincingly identifying
productivity and factor price effects, we focus on intermediate inputs in the following.10 By
7The consumer price data underlying the construction of official CPI data is not well-suited for our purposes for
at least two reasons. First, it is usually less disaggregated than import price data derived from trade statistics.
For example, UK CPI data are collected for around 800 items of which only part are for manufactured goods.
By contrast, the HS system has information for over 4,000 products. Second, none of the available data
distinguishes between domestically produced and imported products, let alone between products imported from
different origin countries. Taken together, these limitations imply that it will be difficult to detect the impact
of the individual trade agreements in our sample, most of which only accounted for a small share of total EU
imports (and an even smaller share of total consumption). Furthermore, our identification strategy will rely
on comparing prices of imports from different origins with and without trade agreements with the EU, which
would not be possible with CPI data (or other sources such as barcode scanner data).
8We provide evidence for the latter assumption in Section 5.2.
9We discuss the implications of the constant markups assumption in more detail in Section 5.2.
10Again, the key identification challenge is that adequately capturing the effects of modern trade agreements
requires the use of dummy variables which do not have a sectoral dimension (see Section 3.1). Hence, the usual
approach in the literature to use cross-sectional variation in tariff reductions is ruled out here. In addition, the
free trade agreements we consider account each for only a small share of EU12 imports and an even smaller share
of domestic absorption, making the identification of effects on productivity and factor prices all but impossible.
By contrast, our difference-in-difference identification strategy will rely on the much finer cross-origin variation
in the trade data.
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analogy to our preference structure for final goods, we assume that intermediates can be sourced
domestically (iD) or imported (iM) according to:
is =
(
(isD)
εs−1
εs + (isM)
εs−1
εs
) εs
εs−1
.
As in Blaum et al. (2015) and Caliendo and Parro (2015), we assume a roundabout production
structure where firms use a sector-specific domestic input that is produced using the output of
all other firms in the economy:
(9) isD =
S∏
j=1
Y
ϕjs
js and Yjs =
 Zj∑
z=1
y
εj−1
εj
jzs

εj
εj−1
= (Zj)
εj
εj−1 yjzs,
where ϕjs is the value share of inputs that sector s sources from sector j, and where we have
again assumed identical firms in each sector. Similar to imported final goods, the imported
intermediate input bundle has two layers. At the upper level, it consists of several HS 6-digit
products (h):
isM =
∏
h∈Hs
iϕshhM .
Second, we have different origin countries (o) within each HS6-digit code:
ihM =
(∑O
o=1
∑nohM
z=1
(qohM (z) i
o
hM (z))
(εhM−1)/εhM
) εhM
εhM−1
,
where noh is the number of imported varieties within each destination. Note that this structure
is an exact analogue to imports of final good with the exception that the elasticities εhM now
measure production substitutability within HS codes. As we show in Appendix A, this means
that the exact price index of the product-h component of the imported intermediate bundle
is again given by an expression analoguous to (8). Hence, we will be able to use the same
approach to estimate the impact of trade agreements on the inferred quality, prices and variety
of both final and intermediate goods.
The corresponding price index change for the imported intermediate input bundle is obtained
by aggregating across the HS products used as inputs in sector s:
PsIM,t
PsIM,t−1
=
∏
h∈Hs
(
phM,t
phM,t−1
)ϕsh
,
Thus, the price change of intermediates is:
(10)
PsI,t
PsI,t−1
=
(
PsIM,t
PsIM,t−1
)ωsIMt ( PsID,t
PsID,t−1
)ωsIDt
,
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where ωsIMt and ωsIDt are the Sato-Vartia weights of imported and domestic intermediates.
Assuming that TFP and factor prices are not affected by trade agreements, we have that the
change in domestic prices in sector s is
(11)
PsD,t
PsD,t−1
=
psD,t
psD,t−1
=
(
PsI,t
PsI,t−1
)1−αs
.
Note that the initial trade-agreement-induced reduction in input prices in sector s affects
firms in all sectors of the economy through input-output linkages, further reducing input prices
and hence sectoral prices, psD,t. To solve for the total change in psD,t, we use the exact price
index associated with the production function of the domestic input bundle (9):
(12)
PsID,t
PsID,t−1
=
S∏
j=1
(
pjD,t
pjD,t−1
)ϕjs
.
Equations (10), (11) and (12) together imply the following system of S equations (one per
sector):
ln
(
PsID,t
PsID,t−1
)
= ln
(
S∏
j=1
(((
PjIM,t
PjIM,t−1
)ωjIMt ( PjID,t
PjID,t−1
)ωjIDt)1−αj)ϕjs)
=
S∑
j=1
ωjIMt (1− αj)ϕjs ln
(
PjIM,t
PjIM,t−1
)
+
S∑
j=1
ωjIDt (1− αj)ϕjs ln
(
PjID,t
PjID,t−1
)
.(13)
Once we have estimated the direct FTA-induced change in PjIM,t/PjIM,t−1, we can solve the
system for PsID,t/PsID,t−1 to get the total effect on intermediate domestic prices. Written in
matrix notation, the system (13) becomes:
−−−→
∆PID = ΩM
−−−→
∆PIM + ΩD
−−−→
∆PID,
where
−−→
∆X are S×1 column vectors of (logs of) ideal price indices and ΩM and ΩD are S×S
matrices of modified I-O input coefficients (i.e., the ωjI{D,M}t (1− αj)ϕjs from equation 13).
Solving this system by matrix inversion yields:
−−−→
∆PID = (I − ΩD)−1 ΩM−−−→∆PIM .
With the solution for all PsID,t/PsID,t−1 in hand, we can compute the change in input prices
and the resulting change in domestic prices using (10) and (11). The final step is to use trade
and expenditure data to compute the relative shares of domestic and imported goods in the
sectoral price indices (3) and to aggregate up the economy-wide consumer price index (2). We
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will implement this aggregation procedure in Section 5.4 but we first return to the estimation
of price, quality and variety effects of trade agreements at the HS 6-digit level.
3. Quantifying the Impact of Trade Agreements
The decomposition in equation (8) is central to calculating the impact of trade agreements
on consumer prices. As discussed, this equation applies regardless of whether the underlying
HS 6-digit product is used for final consumption or as an intermediate input.11 In this section,
we describe how we estimate the effect of trade agreements on the individual components of
(8).
We start with a straightforward estimating equation to determine the impact of trade agree-
ments on prices. We then move towards inferring quality and estimating the impact of trade
agreements on quality and variety. Our empirical methodology consists of four steps. First,
we estimate the elasticities of substitution σh for each HS 6-digit product, based on Feenstra
(1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006). Then we infer quality and variety using the estimated
elasticities and different proxies to control for hidden variety. Next, we estimate the impact
of trade agreements on each of the components of (8). Once we have these estimates, we can
replace λht/λht−1, poht/p
o
ht−1 and q
o
ht/q
o
ht−1 with predicted FTA-induced changes for the origin
countries affected by the trade agreement.12 This gives us a counterfactual change in the exact
price index for each imported HS 6-digit product, which serves as the basic building block for
the price index aggregation just described.
3.1. The Price Impact of TAs. We model the impact of trade agreements on (non-quality-
and non-hidden-variety-adjusted) prices as follows:
ln poht = (αp)
o
h + (αp)t + βp × FTAot + µoht,
where (αp)
o
h and (αp)t are product-origin and time fixed effects. The dependent variable is
the unit value obtained directly from trade data by dividing sales of a product-origin-time
observation by its quantity. FTAot is a dummy which is one for origin countries o that have a
free trade agreement with the EU at time t, and βp measures the FTA's price impact. Following
the literature on trade agreements (e.g., Baier and Bergstrand, 2007), we use a FTAot dummy
rather than tariff changes as a regressor. The new generation of deep trade agreements contain
11The only difference for intermediates is that the elasticity parameters capture substitability in production
rather than consumption. However, the elasticity estimation procedure (and hence the estimate) is the same
irrespective of the product's use (see below).
12As will become clear, proxies for hidden varieties available from standard datasets are not well suited for
estimating the impact of FTAs on noht. In practice, we will thus assume that n
o
ht does not change after the entry
into force of an FTA. We return to this point below and discuss the implications for our estimated overall price
index changes.
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important measures such as the elimination of non-tariff barriers through harmonization of
regulations on cross-border trade and investment that are harder to define at the level of a
product. Tariff reductions or selective regulation measures are unlikely to capture these policy
changes and would underestimate the impact of trade agreements on consumer welfare.
Note that while the choice of FTA partners by the EU is clearly not random, the use of
product-origin fixed effects eliminates or at least reduces the most obvious problems arising
from reverse causality and omitted variables bias by controlling for time-invariant trade part-
ner characteristics. Given the absence of suitable instruments, the use of fixed effects is indeed
the preferred approach in the trade agreement literature (e.g., Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).
Nevertheless, if the EU systematically signed agreements with countries whose export prices
are on a downward trajectory compared to other countries, the common-trend assumption un-
derlying the standard difference-in-differences approach would be violated. The new generation
of trade agreements negotiated by the EU are less likely to suffer from this problem, because
they were motivated by regional geopolitics (such as the enlargement of the EU) or were pri-
marily with smaller countries to catch up with the agreements negotiated by the United States.
For example, Pelkmans and Brenton (1999) argue that economic factors are only one of the
many which propel the EU towards such agreements. Brenton and Manchin (2003) go further
to say that economic integration agreements are at the forefront of EU policy towards de-
veloping countries and neighboring countries in Europe, including the countries of South-East
Europe. DeBardeleben (2009) summarizes that the new agreements with Central and Eastern
European countries cemented new governance linkages with some of Russia's closest neighbors.
Through guarantees based on the NATO charter and integration into the fabric of Europe's
social, political and economic life, the enlargement process largely removed these countries
as `zones of contention'between the West and Russia. The new trade agreements with these
countries therefore reflected a policy objective of stabilizing post-Cold War Europe (Woolcock,
2007).13
Likewise, trade agreements with non-member countries such as Mexico reflected a catch-up
game by the EU to keep pace with the trade agreements signed by the US. Baccini (2010) finds
that a trade agreement with the EU is more likely for a country that had a trade agreement
with the US in the previous year. The study argues that the EU reacted to trade agreements
signed by the US with developing countries to avoid losing trade with the joining country or to
establish its own regulatory standard in the international system. Woolcock (2007) documents
that EU's FTA negotiations with Mexico, Mercosur, Central America, ASEAN and South Korea
13We will mainly focus the association agreements between the EU and the 2004 and 2007 accession countries
that already came into force in the 1990s (see Section 4 below for details).
TRADE AGREEMENTS AND CONSUMER WELFARE 14
followed FTAs negotiated or envisaged by the US (e.g., CAFTA, USSingapore, USThailand
and USMalaysia, and USKorea agreements) and to a lesser extent Japan. This suggests that
concern for future trade diversion rather than potential trade creation motivated many of the
agreements signed by the EU.
Finally, it is worth noting that our results are less likely to suffer from political economy
concerns because the EU negotiates trade agreements on behalf of its member countries' gov-
ernments, implying there are fewer concerns that country-specific factors are driving FTA
partner choice. In the light of these arguments, we believe that endogeneity bias is less likely
in the context of EU FTAs. Below, we also provide additional evidence that the FTAs in our
sample are not correlated with pre-trends in quality or prices.
We estimate βp through the following first-differenced regression:
(14) ln poht − ln poht−r =
[
(αp)t − (αp)t−r
]
+ βp × (FTAot − FTAot−r) +
(
µoht − µoht−r
)
.
Once we have estimates for βp, we can compute a counterfactual price change due to the FTA
as pˆoht/pˆ
o
ht−r = exp
(
βˆp × (FTAot − FTAot−r)
)
. Replacing poht/p
o
ht−1 with pˆ
o
ht/pˆ
o
ht−1 in (8) gives
us the counterfactual impact of trade agreements on the price of HS product h from origin o at
time t. Note that it does not matter whether product h is imported as an intermediate input
or for final consumption  equation (14) applies regardless.
3.2. Inferring Quality. We now discuss how to estimate the quality impact of trade agree-
ments. Under CES import demand, the total import value of HS 6-digit product h from origin
o at time t is
Xoht = n
o
ht (p
o
ht/q
o
ht)
1−σh pσh−1ht Eht,
where Eht is total expenditure on HS-product h. Taking logs and defining αht ≡ ln pσh−1ht Eht,
lnXoht = αht + (1− σh) ln poht + lnnoht − (1− σh) ln qoht.
Bilateral trade data give trade values Xoht and unit values p
o
ht, but not direct measures of quality.
In principle, we could infer quality by regressing trade values on prices as follows:
lnXoht = αht + (1− σh) ln poht + oht,
where αht are product-time fixed effects and 
o
ht ≡ lnnoht − (1− σh) ln qoht is an error term
capturing quality. But this approach would give biased estimates of σh because prices are likely
to be correlated with quality so that there is an endogeneity problem.
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Following Khandelwal et al. (2013), we can infer quality (up to a constant) if we have esti-
mates for σh and proxies for n
o
ht through the following relationship:
(15) lnXoht − (1− σˆh) ln poht = αht + ln nˆoht − (1− σˆh) ln qoht.
To obtain estimates of σh, we build on Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006) but
extend their methodology to include an improved treatment of measurement error in our price
proxy (unit values), which also affects the weighting matrix of the WLS estimator. Appendix B
contains a detailed exposition of our estimation strategy. Our key generalization is to account
for the measurement error that is likely to be present in observed prices of the variety which
is used to normalize the price changes in the elasticity estimation. In practice, the Feenstra-
Broda-Weinstein methodology and our approach yield very similar estimates. The median of
σˆh across our HS 6-digit estimates is 3.20 compared to 3.16 using the FBW approach.
14 Below,
we also show that our results are not affected by using the FBW estimates instead.
To capture hidden varieties, we use an approach similar to Amiti and Khandelwal (2013).
Hidden varieties are defined as a function of the GDP of the partner country, noht = (GDP
o
t )
βg
where g refers to a group of products within the same HS 3-digit code. This draws on standard
trade models (Krugman, 1980) that predict that the number of varieties produced is increasing
in a country's size. Note that we add flexibility by allowing the relationship between varieties
and GDP to vary across broad product categories, although imposing a uniform coefficient does
not change the following results.
As a robustness check, we will also proxy for noht more directly using the number of firms in
a given country, year and sector. This information is available from UNIDO for 4-digit ISIC
manufacturing industries across countries, which we map into our HS codes. The hidden variety
term is now modelled as noht = (N
o
it)
η for products within a more aggregate UNIDO industry
i. The underlying assumption here is that the number of unobservable varieties varies across
industries (but not across products) for each origin country. The downside of this approach is
that it reduces the number of available observations by close to 50%.
Note that while (15) applies to final products, it is straightforward to show that an exact
analogue holds for intermediate products. The only difference is again that the final consump-
tion good elasticity σh is replaced by the intermediate input elasticity εhM (see Appendix A).
Furthermore, our FBW-type estimation procedure and the resulting elasticity estimate are the
same irrespective of an imported product's use. Hence, for a given HS product, the exact
14We have elasticity estimates for approximately 4,000 HS6 products. Our value for σˆh compares to median
estimates by Broda and Weinstein (2006, Table IV) for σˆh of 3.1-3.7 for the TSUSA/HTS classification (ca.
11,000-14,000 products depending on the year in question) and 2.7-2.8 for SITC-5-digit (1,500-2,700 products).
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same quality estimation procedure applies and identical quality estimates result independent of
whether the product is used for final consumption or intermediate use. This will prove useful
below as we will argue that for our purposes, it is not possible to neatly divide HS products
into final and intermediate use categories (see Section 5.4).
3.3. The Quality Impact of FTAs. Having estimated elasticities of substitution, we can use
the two proxies of hidden varieties to infer quality. Defining lnY oht ≡ lnXoht − (1− σˆh) ln poht
from equation (15), the first proxy for hidden variety implies the following regression:
lnY oht = αht + βg lnGDP
o
t + ε
o
ht,
where εoht ≡ − (1− σˆh) ln qoht. We regress lnY oht on product-time FE and GDPs of the origin
countries to obtain quality inferences from the residual and the estimated elasticities of substi-
tution. Using the second proxy for hidden variety, the implied regression for quality inferences
is:
lnY oht = αht + η lnN
o
it + ε
o
ht.
Note that in both cases, quality is estimated as a residual. Holding price and the number of
hidden varieties fixed, any remaining variation in imports of product h from origin o is attributed
to quality. In line with the existing literature (e.g., Khandelwal, 2010), we choose this indirect
approach because more direct information on quality-related attributes is not available for the
wide range of product and origin countries in our sample.
Having inferred quality, we use the same approach as for prices to model the impact of trade
agreements on quality:
ln qˆoht = (αq)
o
h + (αq)t + βq × FTAot + µoht,
where (αq)
o
h and (αq)t are product-origin and time fixed effects. We again estimate βq through
a difference-in-differences regression:
(16) ln qˆoht − ln qˆoht−r =
[
(αq)t − (αq)t−r
]
+ βq × (FTAot − FTAot−r) + (µoht − µohs) .
Once we have estimates for βq, we can compute a counterfactual quality change due to the FTA
as qˆoht/qˆ
o
ht−r = exp
(
βˆq × (FTAot − FTAot−r)
)
. Replacing qoht/q
o
ht−1 with qˆ
o
ht/qˆ
o
ht−1 in (8) gives
us the counterfactual impact of FTAs on the quality component of the product-specific price
index.
3.4. The Variety Impact of FTAs. The contribution of changes in the number of available
varieties to the exact HS-level price index is given by λht/λht−1 from equation (8). Intuitively,
TRADE AGREEMENTS AND CONSUMER WELFARE 17
a lower value for λht implies a larger share of new varieties and hence a reduction in the price
index between periods t− 1 and t. By contrast, a lower value of λht−1 signals a higher share of
disappearing varieties and is associated with a larger increase in the exact price index. Using
expression (7), we can directly compute λht/λht−r using our trade data and estimates for σh
and noh obtained from the previous steps, where r denotes the lag used in the computation.
15
To estimate the impact of FTAs on λht/λht−r, we estimate
(17) ln (λht/λht−r) = αt + βv × (FTAot − FTAot−r) + µoht,
where we use the same lag r as for our previous difference-in-differences regressions. Note that
λht/λht−r already measures a change over r periods so that differencing is not required here.
For comparability with our price and quality FTA-impact estimates, we estimate (17) on the
same set of observations. While λht/λht−r does not vary by origin country, different products
are imported from different sets of countries so that there is variation in the FTA-regressor
across both products and time.
Once we have obtained estimates of βv, we compute the FTA-induced contribution of variety
growth to the exact HS-level price index as ̂λht/λht−r = exp
(
βˆv × (FTAot − FTAot−r)
)
.
4. Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
We apply the methods just described to bilateral trade data for the European Union (EU)
which has negotiated a large number of trade agreements over the past two decades. We
examine the overall impact of EU FTAs implemented during our sample period 1993-2013. We
use the term European Union (or EU12 or simply EU) to refer to the twelve member states
prior to the 1995 enlargement (Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Spain). This geographic focus
was chosen to keep the set of countries for our analysis constant over the sample period.
We need data on the value and the quantity of EU imports for each product, information
about the timing of FTAs, and data for our proxies for hidden varieties (GDP and the number
of firms). We obtain origin-specific EU import data at the 6-digit HS level for the period 1993-
2013 from the United Nation's COMTRADE database, accessed through the World Bank's
WITS interface. These trade data are classified according to the version of the Harmonized
System that was in force at the time of reporting. To achieve comparability over time, we
map all data into the 6-digit level of the HS0 (1988/1992) version of the Harmonized System,
15Again, if product h is used as an intermediate input, the interpretation of the elasticity parameter changes,
capturing substitutability between inputs from different origins.
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using concordances provided by WITS. Data on trade agreements and their implementation
dates are available from the European Commission.16 The information on expenditure and
import shares as well as the input-output structure come from the OECD Inter-Country Input-
Output database (2017 edition), which provide data for the 1995-2011 period.17 For the baseline
exercise, the tables are aggregated at the EU12 level, while for the aggregation results of the
heterogeneity analysis we will also use individual country data as well as tables for three country
groups. The input-output structure for the initial and final years of our sample is assumed to
be the same of the first and final year available in the database, respectively 1995 and 2011.
Finally, GDP data are from the World Bank Development Indicators and the number of firms
per sector from the UNIDO Industrial Statistical Database (INDSTAT4).18
Table 1 presents a list of all countries with which the EU signed FTAs between 1993 and
2013. The first group consists of countries which became member states in 2004 and 2007,
respectively. These countries all signed association agreements with the EU several years prior
to accession and we use the respective dates for our FTA dummy. In robustness checks below,
we also control for EU membership to see whether the later EU accession had effects over and
above the trade liberalization measures implemented as part of the association agreements.
The EU also negotiated a number of additional trade agreements over our sample period.
Within Europe, these include a customs union with Turkey, and FTAs or Association Agree-
ments with the Faroe Islands, Macedonia, Croatia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montene-
gro and Serbia. In the Mediterranean, these include agreements with Israel, Algeria, Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia. Further afield, the EU also implemented FTAs with
Mexico, South Africa, Chile, Korea, Peru, Columbia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.19
To illustrate the trade volumes covered by the FTAs analyzed here, Figure 1 shows the value
of EU12 imports by groups of origin countries. In 2012, the single most important source
country for the EU12 was China which accounted for $293bn or 12.5% of total imports from
non-EU12 countries, followed by the United States ($253bn, 10.8%), Russia ($149bn, 6.4%) and
16See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/facilitating-trade/free-trade/index_en.htm#h2-1.
17These data contain information on the expenditure shares needed for the construction of the Sato-Vartia
weights ωst, ωsMt, ωsDt, as well as the modified matrices of input-output coefficients ΩM and ΩD, which also
include ωsIMt and ωsIDt, the Sato-Vartia weights of imported and domestic intermediates.
18To improve time and country coverage we use both the ISIC Rev. 3 and the ISIC Rev. 4 versions of the
database, and we transform all the data in ISIC Rev. 3 using a concordance table available from the authors
on request.
19Croatia is a special case as it only became a EU member at the very end of our sample period (in 2013). In
this paper, we group Croatia with the "non-EU" agreements. We do not include the 1995 accession countries
(Austria, Finland and Sweden) in either FTA group because they already had FTAs in place with the EU at
the beginning of our sample period and because we would only have two pre-accession years of data to estimate
accessions effects.
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Switzerland ($115bn, 4.9%). This compares to imports of $279bn (11.9%) for the 2004/2007
EU accession countries, and imports of $256bn (10.9%) for the non-EU FTA partners.
5. Empirical Results
We start with our baselines estimates for the impact of the EU's trade agreements on the
prices, quality and variety of imports. Section 5.2 examines the robustness of our results and
Section 5.3 shows how the estimates vary across different countries, product groups and trade
agreements. Finally, Section 5.4 presents our price index aggregation and estimates the total
CPI effect of the EU's trade agreements.
5.1. Baseline Results. Table 2 presents results for our baseline specifications (14), (16) and
(17). We choose a five-year lag for these initial estimations and regress the five-year log change
in prices, quality and variety on the five-year change in the FTA dummy as well as year fixed
effects. The coefficient on the FTA dummy thus tells us whether imports from origin countries
with which the EU has implemented a free trade agreement within the last five years saw
more pronounced changes in the dependent variable (e.g., prices) than imports from other
countries. As discussed above, the same estimation equations apply regardless of whether a
product is imported for final or intermediate input use and hence we include all HS products
in the regressions underlying Table 2.20
Columns (1) and (4) show that FTAs had essentially no effect on import prices and vari-
ety - the corresponding coefficients are statistically insignificant and close to zero. However,
FTAs did increase the quality of imported goods by around 7% (column 2) and this effect is
highly statistically significant. We obtain very similar results if we use the Broda-Weinstein
elasticities instead of our own estimates (column 3). Column (5) combines the price and quality
estimates by showing that the net effect of FTAs on quality-adjusted prices is also negative and
significant.21
These results highlight the importance of taking quality into account. A naive approach which
simply regresses unit values on indicators of trade liberalization (such as our FTA dummy)
would erroneously conclude that trade agreements have no impact on consumers. At least for
the case of the FTAs implemented by the EU12, the entire effect works through changes in
quality.
20See Section 5.4 for why a division of HS products into final and intermediate use categories is problematic for
our purposes. We will allow for different types of heterogeneity in Section 5.3, however, including across broad
ISIC categories.
21Column (5) also adjusts prices for hidden varieties, i.e., po,adjh = p
o
h/
(
(noh)
1/(σh−1) qoh
)
. Not adjusting for
hidden varieties yields very similar estimates.
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Our findings are consistent with a number of recent papers that also document quality-
upgrading in response to trade liberalization or other changes in trade costs. Using plant-
product-level data for the post-NAFTA period 1994-2004, Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) show
that Mexican firms entering the U.S. market upgrade product quality in preparation for ex-
porting because of the higher demand for quality by U.S. consumers. Similarly, Verhoogen
(2008) shows that Mexican exporters upgraded quality in response to the currency devaluation
of the late-1994 peso crisis. Given that the EU12's level of per-capita income is high relative to
almost all of its recent trade agreements partners, quality upgrading for the EU market seems
a plausible mechanism underlying our results. Below, we also present additional evidence that
quality increases were particularly pronounced for the group of EU countries with the highest
per-capita income.
There is also evidence that lower import barriers can lead to quality-upgrading by domestic
firms by improving access to imported intermediate inputs (Fan et al., 2015; Bas and Strauss-
Kahn, 2015). In view of the fact that most of the EU's agreements had a reciprocal element,
reduced import barriers in the exporting countries could be a complementary explanation for
our findings.22
Finally, if trade barrier reductions take the form of an elimination of quotas, liberalization
can also lead to quality-downgrading as firms no longer face quantity restrictions encouraging
the export of high-value products (Harrigan and Barrows, 2009). Clearly, this explanation is
at odds with our finding of quality-upgrading, consistent with the fact that quota elimination
was at best a small part of the EU's trade agreements.
5.2. Robustness. Tables 3-10 examine the robustness of our baseline results. In Table 3, we
control for changes in per-capita GDP of the origin country of EU imports. Per-capita GDP
has been shown to be an important correlate of the quality of exported goods (e.g., Schott,
2004; Feenstra and Romalis, 2012) and is thus a potential origin-time varying omitted variable.
At the same time, however, there is strong evidence that productivity and per-capita GDP are
themselves positively influenced by increased export opportunities (e.g., Trefler, 2004). So the
estimates in Table 3 are best interpreted as eliminating the indirect effect of FTAs on quality
working through changes in per-capita GDP. In any case, the coefficient estimates are almost
identical to our baseline estimates from Table 2. As expected, per-capita GDP is also positively
correlated with quality and prices.
22Unfortunately, it is not possible to provide a more direct test in our setting given the difficulties of measuring
the degree of reciprocity. (As discussed, non-tariff barriers are the key component of the FTAs in our sample,
so that the total effects are best captured by binary variables.)
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Table 4 examines the importance of functional form. Column (1) uses two-year instead of
five-year differences. As before, the effect of the FTAs on prices and variety is insignificant. The
impact on quality is still statistically significant although the coefficient magnitude decreases
by around 50%. This is consistent with the idea that quality upgrading might take time and
will not materialise fully and immediately after the FTA has come into force.
Column (2) estimates a fixed-effects regression where the log of quality and price is regressed
on product-origin country and year fixed effects. That is, instead of taking differences over time
we eliminate the product-origin effects (αp)
o
h through a within-transformation. The results
for quality are again similar to our baseline. In contrast, FTAs are now estimated to have
a significantly positive impact on prices. We cannot use the fixed effects approach for variety
because the variety component of the price index change is inherently defined in first differences
(equation 17).
In columns (3) and (4) we use a single two-year and five-year difference for each FTA,
respectively. Specifically, we estimate the change in quality, prices and variety from one year
prior to the implementation year of the FTA to either one or four years after the implementation
year (i.e., t-1 to t+1 and t-1 to t+4). We would expect to find slightly larger effects compared
to our baseline estimates because on average we now evaluate the effect of the FTA after a
longer time period.23 This is indeed the case, with the estimated impact on quality in column
(4) being almost 50% larger than in the baseline specification.
One potential criticism of our baseline difference-in-differences approach is that, for a given
product, we include all origin countries with which the EU has not implemented a free trade
agreement in our control group. In Table 5, we instead select the relevant control group for
each FTA through a simple matching procedure. We first use a logit regression to predict the
likelihood that an FTA between the EU and a given origin country was implemented between
t-5 and t (i.e., FTAot − FTAot−5) as a function of bilateral distance, a contiguity dummy and
initial GDP of the origin country. We use the resulting propensity score estimates to construct
control groups for each FTA partner using radius matching and imposing an exact match on
year and product code.24 Table 5 shows results for different values of the imposed matching
radius (r = 0.05, r = 0.1 and r = 0.2). We again find a positive and significant impact of FTAs
23For example, if an FTA took place in year t, our baseline five-year difference estimates represent an average
of the effects from t-5 to t, t-4 to t+1, t-3 to t+2, t-2 to t+3 and t-1 to t+4.
24That is, for each FTA implemented by the EU, we first select a group of control countries with a similar
propensity score to the FTA partner country (where similarity is defined by the matching radius). For each
product and year, we then calculate the difference in the five-year log difference of the variable in question (e.g.,
quality) between the partner country and the average of the control group. The average treatment effect on
the treated (ATT) for the FTA in question is the average across all relevant product-year differences, and the
treatment effect reported in Table 5 is the average of the FTA-specific ATTs. Standard errors are obtained
via cluster-bootstrapping, where clusters are at the partner-time level for comparison with the clustering of
standard errors in our baseline specifications.
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on the quality of imported goods. FTAs now also seem to have a positive impact on prices
although the coefficient estimate is again much smaller in magnitude than that for quality.25
In Table 6 we examine the sensitivity of our results to different ways of proxying for hidden
varieties (nˆoht in equation 15). In column 1, we do not control for hidden varieties at all. In
column 2, we proxy nˆoht by origin fixed effects, in column 3 by origin-by-1-digit-HS fixed effects
and in column 4 by origin-by-3-digit-HS fixed effects. Column 5 uses the number-of-firms proxy
described in Section 3. That is, the hidden variety term is now modelled as noht = (N
o
it)
η where
N oit is the number of firms from origin country o at time t within the more aggregate UNIDO
industry i to which HS product h belongs, and η is a parameter estimated in our first-stage
quality regression.26 The results in Table 6 show that our estimates of the impact of FTAs on
quality are not particularly sensitive to the way we control for hidden varieties. The estimated
FTA coefficients are either similar in magnitude or slightly larger than in our baseline regression.
In Table 7 we include an EU membership dummy in our first-difference regression (EUt −
EUt−5). Most of the 2004/2007 accession countries had signed association agreements with
the EU in the mid-1990s which had already liberalized bilateral trade well before the actual
EU accession. The coefficient on the EU dummy will thus tell us whether EU accession had
additional price and quality effects over and above the earlier trade liberalization. One reason we
might expect such effects is a reduction in uncertainty over future access to European markets
which were eliminated for these countries by fully joining the EU (see Handley and Limão,
2012). The results in Table 7 show that EU accession did indeed have an additional positive
and significant effect, increasing quality by about 5% in addition to the 7% increase brought
about by FTAs. In contrast to the FTAs however, EU accession also led to a significant price
increase of about 12%. Importantly, including the EU accession dummy leaves the coefficient
on the FTA dummy basically unchanged for all three dependent variables.27
Table 8 examines the relative role of tariff and non-tariff barriers in explaining our results.
As discussed, one advantage of using an FTA dummy variable is that it also captures non-
tariff barriers (NTBs) which are otherwise hard to measure because of the lack of reliable data.
However, tariff data are available for around 70% of the observations in our sample and in Table
8, we include origin-specific EU import tariffs at the HS 6-digit level as an additional regressor.28
The results show that tariff reductions had no effect on quality, and the coefficient of our FTA
25Note that the variety measure does not vary by origin country so that we cannot implement our matching
procedure for this variable.
26To allocate trade flows to industries, we use a mapping from HS0 to ISIC Rev. 3 available from the World
Bank's WITS website.
27One explanation for this is that the EU and the FTA dummies are highly correlated in levels (correlation
coefficient 0.52) but uncorrelated in changes (correlation coefficient -0.07).
28We use effectively applied tariffs from the TRAINS database which are the lower of the EU's MFN tariff for
a given HS6-digit product and any preferential tariff granted (e.g., as part of a free trade agreement).
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dummy barely changes when we control for tariffs. We conclude that the quality increases we
documented earlier are most likely due to FTA-induced changes in NTBs or additional effects
such a reduction in uncertainty.
In Table 9, we revisit the issue of the potential endogeneity of our FTA dummy. While
we have argued above that endogeneity is less likely in the EU context, a concern with our
identification strategy is that the EU could have systematically signed free trade agreements
with countries whose product quality was on an upward trajectory, violating the common trend
assumption underlying our difference-in-differences specification. In Table 9, we report results
of a placebo check where we regress our differenced price, quality and variety measures on
an indicator for whether the EU implemented a trade agreement with a given origin country
within the next five years. If the EU systematically signed agreements with countries with
underlying pre-trends in our variables of interest, the coefficient on this lead indicator should
be statistically significant. As the results in Table 9 show, however, this is not the case for
our sample of trade agreements, suggesting that pre-trends are unlikely to explain our earlier
results.29
In our next robustness check, we investigate whether the EU's trade agreements led to a loss
of domestic varieties. There is no data on domestically produced varieties at the HS 6-digit
level, so we cannot use the same approach as in Section 2. Instead, we follow Hsieh et al. (2016)
in associating varieties with plants or establishments, and measure the number of varieties as
the number of establishments in a given sector.30 We also require a new identification strategy
to link trade agreements to changes in our domestic variety proxy. We construct an industry-
specific exposure indicator which measures the share in total EU absorption (i.e., production
plus imports minus exports) accounted for by origin countries with which the EU has a trade
agreement. This indicator is defined as Ets =
∑
o FTAot × ABSos, where FTAot is a binary
indicator taking the value one if the EU had a trade agreement with country o at time t,
and ABSos is the share of country o in total EU absorption in industry s in 1993.
31 This
29In an unreported robustness check, we have also computed the trade flow increases implied by our quality-
adjusted prices and the relevant price elasticities. For the median HS product in our data (σh = 3.2), we obtain
a predicted trade flow increase of 16%. This magnitude seems to be plausible given a median five-year change
in actual trade flows in our sample of 26% and a median change of 43% for the five-year periods around trade
agreements.
30Hsieh et al. (2016) show theoretically that welfare changes arising from changes in the set of establishments
serving a country can be decomposed into changes in the number of establishments and their average produc-
tivity. An exact measure of the total change requires separate data on the sales of continuing firms which is
not available in our context. Thus, the approach we outline in the following is best thought of as an approxi-
mation unless we are in the special case where entering, exiting and continuing establishments have the same
productivity.
31Production data and the count of establishments are from the UNIDO database and sectors are defined at
the 4-digit level of the ISIC Rev. 3 classification (145 sectors). We use of a time-invariant absorption share to
reduce problems arising from the potential endogeneity of our absorption measure.
TRADE AGREEMENTS AND CONSUMER WELFARE 24
indicator captures the importance of the countries with which the EU signs trade agreements.
For example, if the EU signs a new agreement with an important producer, Ets will increase
by more than if the agreement is signed with a country that only accounts for a very small
share of total absorption in industry s. Next, we regress the log of the count of establishments
in the EU in industry s on our exposure variable, controlling for sector and year fixed effects.
If import competition triggered by new trade agreements led to a reduction in domestically
produced varieties, we would expect a negative and significant coefficient on Ets. As Table 10
shows, our estimated coefficient is indeed negative once we control for sector fixed effects, but
far from conventional levels of statistical significance. We conclude that there is no prima fascia
evidence that trade agreements led to a reduction in domestic varieties.32
Finally, we discuss the role of the assumption of constant markups in our setting. We have
assumed a CES constant-markup setting and focused on import prices because the available
consumer price information is less detailed than the fine product categorization of trade data
and does not allow for a convincing identification of trade agreement effects due to the absence
of cross-origin variation.33 In terms of welfare changes, this means that our estimates should
be interpreted as the lower bound of the potential gains to final consumers, as long as import
competition lowers the markups charged by firms to consumers. We would ideally like to
estimate how much consumers gain from reductions in markups charged by firms when import
competition intensifies. Unfortunately, this is not feasible in our setting because of the same
data constraints that arise in the literature pioneered by Broda and Weinstein (2006) which uses
trade data. Additional firm-level market shares are needed to determine the markups charged
to consumers.34 However, a large empirical literature finds that increased competition from
integration lowers markups charged in the importing country. Dhingra and Morrow (2012) show
that the CES demand setting, where markups do not fall with import competition, provides
a lower bound for the gains from integration in models of imperfect competition. As we work
with a CES demand setting where markups do not vary, our results can be interpreted as a
lower bound of the potential gains from trade to consumers.35
32By contrast, Hsieh et al. find that the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) led to negative net welfare
effects from establishment entry and exit. This difference seems plausible given that CUSFTA represented a
much more significant shock for Canadian firms given the size and proximity of the US.
33See footnote 7 for details.
34See Blaum et al. (2015), Feenstra and Weinstein (2010) or Bernard and Dhingra (2015) for different approaches
that rely on firm-level or other data not available for the broad range of countries in our sample.
35Throughout, we have focused on simple c.i.f. import values, rather than c.i.f. values inclusive of tariffs, as the
basis of our analysis. This is because tariff data are missing for a large part of our sample and because tariff
revenue might of course benefit consumers in other ways. If we base our unit value and quality estimates on c.i.f.
prices inclusive of tariffs, we unsurprisingly find a slightly larger role for price reductions (many agreements
contain a tariff reduction component) and a correspondingly smaller quality effect. However, this does not affect
our overall CPI effects presented below, nor the earlier headline finding that only quality matters for the EU12
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5.3. Heterogeneity Analysis. Our headline results in Table 2 present an average treatment
effect across products, exporting countries and EU12 member states. We now investigate
how treatment effects vary across these groups. The main challenge faced in this context
is that the data and the corresponding regression results become increasingly noisy as we
move to finer levels of disaggregation, especially for some of the smaller countries and trading
partners. Disaggregation also creates issues of spurious significance when analysing dozens or
even hundreds of coefficient estimates, as statistically significant effects will appear by virtue of
Type I errors alone. We use a two-pronged approach to address these issues. We first present
results for different groupings of importing countries, trading partners and products which we
believe are of interest and are justifiable from an ex-ante perspective. We then use a version of
our baseline regression sample where we split up total EU imports into imports by each of the
twelve member states. We run our baseline equations on these importer-exporter-product-year
specific data and interact the trade agreement indicator with a set of explanatory variables
such as the income level of the importer, bilateral distance or initial import shares. This allows
us to highlight broad trends in terms of heterogeneity while imposing enough structure to
significantly reduce problems of spurious significance.36
Panel A of Table 11 shows results for regressions where we split our sample into three groups
of EU12 countries. We do so according to per-capita income levels in 2005 which also broadly
corresponds to a split along geographic lines: Portugal, Greece and Spain (low income, South);
Italy, France, Germany and Denmark (middle income, Central); and Belgium/Luxembourg,
the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands (high income, North).37
There is a substantial amount of heterogeneity across these three groups. In particular, the
group of the four richest EU member states saw a much larger increase in the quality of imported
products - around 13% as opposed to a statistically insignificant 0.3% for Portugal, Greece and
Spain. By contrast, the latter group saw a stronger and statistically highly significant decline
in import prices close to 6%. One potential explanation for this heterogeneity is that demand
for quality is higher in high income countries (e.g., Hallak, 2010), so that the incentives for
quality upgrading by exporters discussed above might have been stronger.
as a whole (the price effects in Table 2 are still statistically insignificant, and the quality effects are significantly
positive).
36We have also used the same disaggregated dataset to perform a large number of sample splits, generating
treatment effects for each exporter-FTA partner-ISIC combination in the data. We then regressed the resulting
set of coefficient estimates on the same set of explanatory variables. Results were qualitatively very similar to
the interaction regressions presented below (available from the authors on request).
37We use GDP per capita on a PPP basis for 2005 from the World Bank Development Indicators for this ranking.
Belgium and Luxembourg report trade data jointly, and we use a population-weighted mean of Belgium and
Luxembourg GDP per capita.
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In Panel B, we perform similar sample splits by income level for the EU's trade agreement
partner countries. We use the World Bank's income classification to allocate partner countries
to three groups: low and lower middle income, upper-middle income, and high income. Results
again reveal substantial differences across income groups. We find large and statistically signif-
icant increases in product quality only for the two lower income groups but not for high income
FTA partners. Overall, agreements with low and lower middle income countries seem most
beneficial to EU consumers in terms of price, quality and variety effects. For upper-middle in-
come partners, strong increases in quality are partially offset by higher prices. For high income
FTA partners, we did not find any significant effects.38
Panel C splits partner countries by type of agreement and geographic location. We distinguish
future EU members (the 2004/2007 accession countries), the Stabilization and Association
Agreements with the Balkan countries (the ex-Yugoslav republics and Albania), the Euro-Med
Assocation Agreements with the EU's meditarranean neighbors and non-regional free trade
agreements with Korea, South Africa and South and Central American countries. We find the
strongest quality effects for future EU members and the Balkan countries, followed by the non-
regional agreements. While we observe no statistically significant quality increase for the Euro
Med countries, prices as measured by unit values did fall by around 7% after the implementation
of trade agreements with the EU. These results demonstrate that the correlation of quality
increases and partner country income levels observed in panel B is complex and also reflects
differences across types of agreements and the geographic location of the EU's partner countries.
Table 12 disaggregates our results by product groups. We use 13 sectors, which for non-service
industries corresponds to a level of aggregation slightly above the two-digit level of the ISIC
classification. We map the HS codes underlying our baseline estimates into these sectors and re-
estimate our baseline specification for each ISIC subsample separately.39 For all sectors, quality
increases were either positive and significant or insignificantly different from zero. Overall,
six out of thirteen sectors saw statistically significant FTA-induced increases in the quality of
imported goods, with the strongest effects observed for machinery and motor vehicles, followed
by textile products and wood, paper and printing. Estimates for prices and variety are again
much smaller and stastically and economically insignificant for the vast majority of sectors.
One exception is Machinery and equipment n.e.c. where we estimate a statistically significant
price decline of around 9%.
38We caution that this last group only contains two partner countries, Israel and Korea; the agreement with
Korea also only came into force in 2011, so that the resulting effects might not yet be fully present in our data.
39The mapping from HS0 codes to ISIC Rev. 3 comes from the World Bank's WITS website. Note that only
a small number of HS codes map into service industries, so we present one aggregate estimate for the entire
service sector (ISIC 40_99). (There are not enough HS codes to obtain further breakdowns within services.)
We will return to the issue of direct import effects in services in our aggregation exercise below.
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We next turn to the interaction regressions using the fully disaggregated sample. That is,
we now model the impact of trade agreements on prices and quality as
ln yodht = (αp)
od
h + (αp)t + βy0 × FTAot +
J∑
j=1
βyj × FTAot × Cj +
J∑
j=1
γyjCj + µ
od
ht ,
where y ∈ {p, q} denotes price or quality, and the Cj are a set of time-invariant product,
exporter and importer specific variables, such as bilateral distance, the type of trade agreement
or the initial market share of exporting country o in total imports by importing (EU12) country
d in HS product h (see Table 13 for the full list). As discussed, we no longer use aggregate
EU12 imports, hence the new subscript d and the use of exporter-importer-product fixed effects,
(αp)
od
h . As before, we eliminate all time-invariant variables by taking first differences over time:
(18) ln ∆5y
od
ht = ∆5αPt + βy0 ×∆5FTAot +
J∑
j=1
βyj × Cj ×∆5FTAot + ∆5µodht ,
where ∆5 denotes five-year differences and ∆5αPt = (αp)t − (αp)t−5 enters the specification as
a set of year fixed effects.
Table 13 presents results for the estimation of (18) using prices and quality as the depen-
dent variable, respectively.40 In columns (1) and (4), we use interaction terms similar to the
categorical variables from Tables 11 and 12: dummy variables for the three income groups of
partner and EU12 countries and dummy variables for the different categories of trade agree-
ments. Columns (2) and (5) instead interact a number of alternative explanatory variables
with the first-differenced FTA dummy. First, we use two standard gravity equation variables
 bilateral distance between the FTA partner and the EU country in question and a dummy
for whether they share a common official language. Second, we control for the initial, pre-
agreement trade share of the partner country in the total imports of an EU12 country as a
measure of the importance of a given trade agreement. Third, we include the time elapsed
since the implementation of an FTA to control for the fact that some of the agreements in our
sample started less than five years before the end of our sample period, so that their effect
might not be fully captured by our first-difference regressions. Finally, we also use a measure
of bilateral differences in revealed comparative advantage as a rough measure of potential gains
40Note that our variety measure does not vary by origin country, so that we cannot estimate interaction regres-
sions for this part of the price decomposition.
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from specialization.41 Columns (3) and (6) combine both sets of regressors. In all regressions,
we also include fixed effects for the 13 ISIC groups as part of the interaction variables (Cj).
The results for our categorical indicators are broadly similar to before. Higher EU im-
porter income levels are associated with significantly stronger quality effects, agreements with
Euromed countries reduce prices and FTAs with future EU members and Balkan countries
increase quality.42 However, we no longer find that agreements with lower income countries
raise quality by more than those with high income countries. Columns 2-3 show that higher
initial market shares, having an official language in common and larger bilateral differences in
revealed comparative advantage are all correlated with a stronger price-reducing effect of FTAs,
although the RCA effect disappears once we control for our categorical variables in column 3.
RCA differences also correlate positively with quality increases, whereas common language is
consistently associated with lower quality effects.43
5.4. Aggregation. We now use our estimates to implement the decomposition of the economy-
wide exact price index outlined in Section 2. For this, we require expenditure and import
shares for different commodity groups (to compute ωst, ωsMt, and ωsDt), as well as intermediate
input shares for the calculation of the indirect domestic price effect (ΩM and ΩD, which also
include ωsIMt and ωsIDt, the Sato-Vartia weights of imported and domestic intermediates).
We use information about these shares from the OECD Inter-Country Input-Output database
for the countries in our sample, aggregated to the EU12 level. As before, we work at a level
of aggregation slightly above the ISIC 2-digit level (13 sectors). Having allocated HS 6-digit
imported products to the different ISIC sectors, we then use input-output data to compute
sectoral linkages and aggregate up to the economy wide CPI.
In principle, our expenditure and input shares can be combined with any of the coefficient
estimates presented in the previous sections. Here, we focus on four sets of estimates. First,
we use our aggregate coefficients from Table 2, which do not vary across exporters, importers
or product groups. That is, we compute our predicted price, quality and variety changes
(qˆoht/qˆ
o
ht−r, pˆ
o
ht/pˆht−r and ̂λht/λht−r) using the same aggregate coefficients across all expenditure
groups s. Second, we allow coefficients to vary by ISIC groups (see Table 12 for details of
these estimates). Third, we again impose coefficient homogeneity across expenditure groups
41The revealed comparative advantage of country i in product h is measured as RCAih = (Xih/Xi) / (Xwh/Xw),
where Xih denotes exports of h by country i, Xi are total exports of i, Xwh are world exports of h and Xw
are total world exports. Our bilateral RCA difference measure for countries i and j is defined as rcadiffij =∑
h |RCAih −RCAjh| and hence captures differences in the export structure of the two countries.
42These coefficient estimates are relative to the excluded category which are observations for low income EU
countries, low and lower middle income partner countries, non regional FTAs and ISIC group 01_05.
43We have also experimented with other explanatory variables such as variables from the World Governance
Indicators and the World Bank's Doing Business database. These regressors were statistically insignificant
throughout.
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but allow estimates to vary across the three EU income groups defined earlier. This allows
us to compute aggregate price effects for each of these groups. Finally, we use the interaction
regression estimates from Table 13 to see how robust our aggregate results are in the presence
of treatment effect heterogeneity.
For each set of coefficient estimates, we decompose the price index changes for each HS
code according to equation (8), restated here using five-year lags for comparability with our
estimates:
pht
pht−5
=
(
λht
λht−5
) 1
σh−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Variety
×Πo∈I
(
noht
noht−5
)− ωoht
σh−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hidden Variety
×Πo∈I
(
poht
poht−5
)ωoht
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prices
×Πo∈I
(
qoht
qoht−5
)−ωoht
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quality
.
We compute price, quality and variety changes due to the FTA as follows:
pˆoht/pˆ
o
ht−5 = exp
(
βˆp × (FTAot − FTAot−5)
)
qˆoht/qˆ
o
ht−5 = exp
(
βˆq × (FTAot − FTAot−5)
)
̂λht/λht−5 = exp
(
βˆv × (FTAot − FTAot−5)
)
where the βˆ are either the aggregate estimates from Table 2, the ISIC-level estimates from Table
12, the country group level estimates from Table 11 or the interaction regression coefficients from
Table 13.44 We use origin Sato-Vartia weights ωoht and the elasticity of substitution estimates
σˆh to calculate the HS 6-digit level price index changes (pht/ph−5) and its price, quality and
variety components.45
The first row of Table 14 reports summary statistics for the total HS-level price index effects
and its components across HS products and years for our set of aggregate estimates from Table
2.46 Note that while the coefficients βˆ do not vary across products, estimated HS-level price
effects are also influenced by the distribution of shares across origin countries which does vary
44For the interaction regressions, we predict yˆodht/yˆ
od
ht−5 = exp
(
βˆy0 ×∆5FTAot +
J∑
j=1
βˆyj × Cj ×∆5FTAot
)
where y denotes price or quality. As discussed, we cannot run interaction regressions for variety. Instead,
we run the baseline variety regression (17) separately for each EU12 country and compute importer-specific
predictions ̂λhdt/λhdt−5 based on the resulting coefficient estimates (βˆvd).
45As discussed, we do not try to estimate an FTA-induced change in hidden varieties because our proxies are too
crude to expect reliable results. A large body of work on firm-level export market entry after trade liberalization
suggests that the number of hidden varieties should be positively affected by FTAs. As such, our counterfactual
price index change is likely to be an underestimate.
46Because we are using overlapping five-year differences in our baseline estimation, we can calculate counterfac-
tual FTA impacts for every year in our sample period. Table 14 reports sample statistics across HS products
and years.
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by HS code. The FTA impact on the mean HS product was to reduce pht/pht−5 by −0.35%.
This is entirely explained by increases in quality, with the impact of the price and variety
components being negligible.
The next aggregation step is to use the shares of each HS product in the total imports
accounted for by a given ISIC sector to compute the import price indices for final goods and
intermediate inputs. Note that we use the same set of HS codes for each of these indices. This
is because in practice, it is not possibly to neatly classify HS codes as either final goods or
intermediate inputs - the same product can be used for both purposes.47 However, our input-
output tables provide information on the share of each ISIC industry allocated to final and
intermediate input use. We use these shares to weight domestic and imported components in
final and intermediate sector-level price indices. Thus, the relative contribution of each HS-level
price change to intermediate and final good price changes is implicitly determined by the use
shares of the corresponding ISIC sector.
Row 2 of Table 14 shows that, when we use the set of aggregate coefficient estimates, FTAs
reduced the final good import price index by an average of−0.42% across ISIC groups and years.
FTA-induced changes in domestic prices working through intermediate input linkages come in
somewhat smaller at −0.06% (row 3). The overall ISIC-level price change is a weighted average
between these two price changes. Because the import share is usually substantially smaller
than the share of domestically produced goods (ωsM < ωsD in equation 3), the overall ISIC-
level average price change is −0.14%, much closer to the domestic price change than the import
price change (row 4).
The final step is to use expenditure shares to aggregate across ISIC price indices to arrive
at an economy wide consumer price index change. Row 5 in Table 14 reports a counterfactual
FTA effect over our entire sample period. This is done by chaining the predicted five-year
changes over the periods 1993-1998, 1998-2003, 2003-2008 and 2008-2013. We also compute
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for the aggregate price effects by resampling 200 times
from the original regression sample underlying the βˆ coefficient estimates. For our aggregate
estimates (Table 14), we find that the cumulative effect of FTAs over the period 1993-2013 was
to lower the aggregate EU12 consumer price index by 0.24%, with a 95% confidence interval of
[−0.19%,−0.28%]. Put differently, in the absence of FTAs, EU quality- and variety-adjusted
consumer prices would be higher by around a quarter of a percent. While this is not a large
effect, it still amounts to substantial savings for EU consumers of around e24 billion per year
47As a consequence, standard attempts at mapping HS products often lead to contradictory results. For example,
the UN's Broad Economic Categories will yield a different set of final consumption goods than when using
concordances from products to consumption classifications such as COICOP (see OECD, 2001).
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given that total consumer expenditure in the EU12 was approximately e10 trillion in 2013.48
A substantial part of this change is due to imported intermediate inputs. If we switch off this
channel by setting the domestic price index change to 0%, the overall CPI effect declines to
−0.13% (see row 6).
One advantage of using our aggregate estimates is that we can easily verify how our different
robustness checks from Section 5.2 translate into aggregate CPI effects. In fact, our baseline
results from Table 2 are at the lower end of the various quality coefficients presented in Tables
3-8, so that the overall CPI effect reported above is best seen as a conservative estimate. For
instance, if we instead use estimates based on the Broda-Weinstein elasticities (Column 3 of
Table 2), the overall impact increases to −0.30% (Row 7 of Table 14); and if we use estimates
based on the number-of-firms proxy for hidden varieties (Column 5 of Table 6), the overall
impact doubles to −0.49%.49
Table 15 summarizes the overall CPI effect for the aggregation exercises based on heteroge-
neous coefficient estimates. Panel (1) shows that using ISIC-level estimates instead of aggregate
estimates slightly increases the overall impact to −0.27% or e27 billion per year (−0.18% if
we switch off the intermediate input channel). Looking at the country group estimates (Panel
2), consumers in all three country groups benefitted from the EU's trade agreements but at
−0.41% the CPI reductions for high-income country consumers were three times larger than
those of consumers in the middle- and low-income groups. For both the ISIC and country-level
aggregations, the aggregate effects are precisely estimated and we can always reject the null of
no overall price effect. Finally, Panel (3) shows that allowing for more coefficient heterogeneity
48Since we estimate the cumulative effect, the consumer savings are smaller in years before 2013, but potentially
higher for all years after, given the lag in the quality effect and the fact that some FTAs were signed towards
the end of the period. We also note that our predicted changes in the economy-wide consumer price index will
in general be different from CPI figures published by national statistical agencies. This is because of different
aggregation schemes and, more importantly, because published CPI figures often do not adequately control for
changes in quality and almost never for changes in the number available varieties. As such, our results should
be interpreted as the true cost of living changes brought about by FTAs which existing CPIs would like to
measure but are currently unable to do.
49Note that we are also using our aggregate estimates to infer price, quality and variety changes for the service
sector (ISIC 40_99). While there is a small set of HS codes that maps into ISIC 40_99, a better interpretation of
this approach is that we are assuming that the FTA impact on services trade (which is not directly measurable
due to the absence of unit values for services imports) is the same as on goods trade. Given the nature of
the new generation of deep trade agreements and their focus on non-tariff barriers, this seems a legitimate
albeit crude way of capturing the overall FTA effect. In any case, switching off all direct service sector effects
by setting the relevant import price changes to zero does not change the overall CPI effect by much (−0.20%
instead of −0.24%). This is because the import share of services is only around 6-7%, limiting the direct impact
of imports. (Note that service industries will still benefit from the indirect effect working through intermediate
goods even if there are no direct import price effects.)
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increases the mean estimated CPI effect to −0.47% (−0.30% without intermediates).50 How-
ever, the noise in the underlying coefficient estimates also increases substantially, leading to
a widening of the 95% confidence interval to [−0.17%,−0.76%]. Hence, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the aggregate effect is equal to −0.24% (the CPI reduction predicted using our
baseline estimates).51
6. Conclusion
This paper examines the consumer welfare effects of the new generation of trade agreements
implemented by the European Union between 1993 and 2013. We find that for the EU12 as a
whole, these agreements increased welfare primarily by raising the quality of imported products
from partner countries. There are important differences across EU countries, trading partners
and the type of trade agreement, however. For example, high-income EU countries (the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium/Luxembourg) saw a much stronger increase
in quality than other EU countries. Indeed, for the group of low-income EU countries (Greece,
Spain and Portugal), the impact of trade agreements worked almost exclusively through a
reduction in prices rather than through increased quality.
Using expenditure shares of EU consumers, we also compute the aggregate consumer price
index effects implied by our estimates. Our baseline results suggest that the trade agreements
implemented by the EU lowered the CPI by 0.24%, saving EU consumers about e24 billion
per year. Of this overall effect, we attribute around 55% to the direct effect on the prices and
quality of imported products. The remaining part is due lower domestic prices brought about
by a reduction in the cost of imported intermediate inputs. Looking across EU country groups
we find that high-income member states saw substantially stronger quality increases and hence
larger overall consumer benefits.
50The sectoral shares and input-output linkages are constructed at the relevant level of aggregation, the three
country groups for Panel 2 and individual countries for Panel 3. In the latter exercise we then aggregate from
the country results to the EU level using countries' shares in aggregate EU12 expenditure in 2013. Using other
forms of aggregation, such as time-varying Cobb-Douglas or Sato-Vartia shares, leads to virtually identical
results.
51In unreported results, we have also examined the distributional effects of the EU's FTA by matching the
ISIC-level price changes from Table 15 (Panel 1) to data on consumer expenditure by income deciles. Our
findings show that the FTA impact was moderately regressive in the sense that richer households saw slightly
stronger CPI reductions than poorer households. This is due to the fact that richer households tend to have
higher expenditure shares for products with higher estimated quality-adjusted prices falls (e.g., motor vehicles).
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Appendix A. Additional Results for Intermediate Inputs
A.1. Derivation of Equation (8) for Intermediate Inputs. We start by restating the
expression for the HS 6-digit level intermediate input bundle:
ihM =
(∑O
o=1
∑nohM
z=1
(qohM (z) i
o
hM (z))
(εhM−1)/εhM
) εhM
εhM−1
.
The associated price index is:[∑O
o=1
∑nohM
z=1
(pohM (z) /q
o
hM (z))
1−εhM
] 1
1−εhM
, εhM > 1.
By analogy to the demand side, we assume that varieties are identical within a product-origin
combination:
phM =
[∑O
o=1
nohM (p
o
hM/q
o
hM)
1−εhM
] 1
1−εhM
,
where nohM is the number of hidden varieties of product h imported from country o.
To use results from the price index literature, we define the quality- and hidden-variety
adjusted price of the HS6 variety from origin o as po,adjhM ≡ pohM/
(
(nohM)
1/(εhM−1) qohM
)
. For a
constant set of origin countries, the price index ratio over time for product h is given by:
phM,t/phM,t−1 = ΠOo=1
(
po,adjhM,t/p
o,adj
hM,t−1
)ωohMt
,
where ωohMt are the Sato-Vartia weights associated with each variety. If the set of varieties (i.e.,
origin countries) changes between periods, the exact price index can be rewritten as:
(A.1) phM,t/phM,t−1 = (λhM,t/λhM,t−1)
1/(εhM−1) Πo∈I
(
po,adjhM,t/p
o,adj
hM,t−1
)ωohMt
,
where
λhMr =
(∑
o∈I
po,adjhM,rx
o
hM,r
)
/
(∑
o′∈Ir
po
′,adj
hM,rx
o′
hM,r
)
r = t− 1, t
and I denotes the set of varieties present in both periods, t and t − 1 (and Ir is the set of
varieties present in period r). Substituting back for po,adjhM into (A.1), the exact price index can
be decomposed into its components of variety, prices, quality, and hidden variety as follows:
(A.2)
phM,t
phM,t−1
=
(
λhMt
λhMt−1
) 1
εhM−1
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Variety
×Πo∈I
(
nohMt
nohMt−1
)− ωohMt
εhM−1
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Hidden Variety
×Πo∈I
(
pohMt
pohMt−1
)ωohMt
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Prices
×Πo∈I
(
qohMt
qohMt−1
)−ωohMt
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Quality
.
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This is of course the exact analogue to equation (8) for final goods, with the difference that the
elasticity parameters εhM now measure production substitutibility within HS codes. Crucially,
however, these parameters can be estimated using the same data and the same Feenstra-Broda-
Weinstein-type procedure described in Appendix B. Thus, for a given elasticity estimate for
product h, the only difference is one of interpretation. If we believe that an HS product is
an intermediate input, our elasticity estimate is a proxy for εhM ; if we believe an HS product
is a final good, our elasticity estimate is a proxy for σh. As we have argued earlier, however,
it is impossible to neatly divide HS products into final and intermediate products given that
the same product often has both uses. Hence, we perform the above decomposition only once
per HS code and instead rely on information on the share of each upper-level ISIC industry
allocated to final and intermediate input use from input-output tables (see Section 5.3). This
means that the relative contribution of each HS-level price change to intermediate and final
goods price changes is implicitly determined by the use shares of the corresponding ISIC sector,
allowing us to avoid a sharp binary classification of an HS code as either a final or intermediate
product.
A.2. Import Demand Equation for Quality Estimation. Recall that we defined the HS
6-digit level intermediate input bundle as:
ihM =
(∑O
o=1
∑nohM
z=1
(qohM (z) i
o
hM (z))
(εhM−1)/εhM
) εhM
εhM−1
.
If varieties are identical within a product-origin combination, this simplifies to:
ihM =
(∑O
o=1
nohM (q
o
hM i
o
hM)
(εhM−1)/εhM
) εhM
εhM−1
.
Hence, import demand given expenditure on h and the associated CES price index is given by:
XohM = n
o
hM (p
o
hM/q
o
hM)
1−εhM pεhM−1hM EhM ,
where EhM denotes total expenditure on imported intermediate input h, and phM is the CES
price index. This is the exact analogue of the import demand equation in Section 3.2 of the
paper, with the demand side elasticity parameter σh replaced by the supply side elasticity εhM .
Hence, all the remaining steps in Section 3.2 carry through for both final and intermediate
products.
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Appendix B. Estimating Elasticities
The estimation strategy follows Feenstra (1994). The import demand equation for each
variety of product h can be expressed in terms of shares and changes over time:
(B.3) ∆ ln soht = ϕht − (σh − 1)∆ ln poht + ∆oht,
where: ϕht = (σh − 1) ln pht and ∆oht is treated as an unobservable random variable, reflecting
changes in the number of varieties and quality.
The dependent variable ∆ ln soht and the regressor ∆ ln p
o
ht might be correlated with the error
term due to the simultaneous determination of import prices and quantities. So equation (B.3)
cannot be directly estimated and some assumptions on the supply side of the economy have to
be made. Simultaneity bias is corrected by allowing the supply of variety o to vary with the
amount of exports, the export supply equation is defined as follows:
∆ ln poht = ψht +
ωh
1 + ωh
∆ ln soht + ∆δ
o
ht,(B.4)
where: ψht = ωh∆ lnwsMht/(1 + ωh) (wsMht is total expenditures on product h), ωh is the
inverse supply elasticity (assumed to be the same across countries) and ∆δoht
The identification strategy relies on the following assumption:
(B.5) E(∆oht∆δ
o
ht) = 0.
This implies that shocks to demand and supply at the variety level are uncorrelated. It is
convenient to eliminate ϕht and ψht by choosing a reference country k and differencing demand
and supply equations, denoted in (B.3) and (B.4), relative to country k.
∆k ln soht = −(σh − 1)∆k ln poht + ∆koht(B.6)
∆k ln poht =
ρh
(σh − 1)(1− ρh)∆
k ln soht + ∆
kδoht(B.7)
where ∆kxoht = ∆x
o
ht−∆xkht, ρh = ωh (σh − 1) / (1 + ωhσh) and satisfies 0 ≤ ρh ≤ (σh − 1) /σh <
1. In order to take advantage of the identification strategy equation (B.6) and (B.7) are then
multiplied together to obtain:
(B.8) (∆k ln poht)
2 = θ1(∆
k ln soht)
2 + θ2(∆
k ln poht∆
k ln soht) + u
o
ht,
where σh = f(θ1, θ2) as shown in the following Proposition.
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Proposition 1. So long as θ1 > 0, then σh and ρh are defined as follows:
ρh =
1
2
+
(
1
4
− 1
4 + (θ22/θ1)
)1/2
if θ2 > 0
ρh =
1
2
−
(
1
4
− 1
4 + (θ22/θ1)
)1/2
if θ2 < 0
σh = 1 +
(
2ρh − 1
1− ρh
)
1
θ2
in both cases
If θ1 < 0, but θ1 > −θ22/4, it is still possible to obtain a value for σh exceeding unity but
ρ /∈ [0, 1].
It is still not possible to consistently estimate equation (B.8) because prices and expenditure
shares are correlated with the error term. Nevertheless, it is possible to obtain a consistent
estimator for the thetas and hence for the elasticity of substitution by averaging (B.8) over
time. The estimation is still possible because σh and the supply elasticity are assumed to be
constant over the varieties of the same product; the former due to the CES demand structure,
the latter for the particular form of the supply curve, whose elasticity is assumed to be equal
across all supplying countries.
Hence, taking the sample means of the variables, equation (B.8) can be rewritten as:
(B.9) (∆k ln poht)
2 = θ1(∆k ln soht)
2 + θ2(∆k ln poht∆
k ln soht) + u
o
ht.
From the assumption that underlines the identification strategy, E
[
uoht
]
= 0.52 This implies
that the expectation of the error term in (B.9) converges to zero and the equation can be
consistently estimated. Let θ̂1 and θ̂2 denote the estimates of θ1 and θ2 obtained by running
weighted least squares (WLS) on (B.9), it turns out that these are equivalent to the Hansen's
(1982) GMM estimator defined as follows:
(B.10) β̂GMM = arg min
θ∈Θ
uoht(β)
′Wuoht(β),
where β =
(
σh
ρh
)
, and W is a positive definite weighting matrix. In order to get a consistent
estimate for σh, first θ̂1 and θ̂2 are obtained by running WLS on (B.9), then σh is computed
using Proposition 1. Whenever an infeasible value for σh is obtained (<1), a constrained
numerical minimization of equation (B.10) is performed using the Nelder and Mead's (1965)
simplex algorithm.53
52Supply and demand error terms are assumed to be independent, see equation (B.5). A further condition to
get identification requires to have some difference in the relative variances of the two error terms. See Feenstra
(1994).
53The variables are constrained as follows: 1 < σh ≤ 135.5 and 0 ≤ ρh < 1. Once a solution is obtained the
non-linear condition ρh ≤ (σh − 1) /σh is checked. If the condition is not satisfied, it implies that a bigger value
of σh would be needed. In the rare event that this happens (on average less than 0.1% of all estimates), σh
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A direct measure of prices is not available, so poht is calculated as a unit value. This implies
that prices are measured with some error. In order to mitigate this problem, Feenstra (1994)
suggests adding a constant to equation (B.9) in order to capture the variance of the measurement
error. Broda and Weinstein (2006) refine the method by imposing some structure to the form
of the error, which also affects the strategy for the form of the weighting matrix in the WLS
estimator.
Let poiht be the price of a particular product of variety o of product h; so that the trade value
pohtx
o
ht =
∑
i p
oi
ht because the quantity of each product, x
oi
ht, always equals one (i.e.: in case of
more items of the same product, the same price is added several times). They assume that
product prices are measured with an i.i.d. error such that poiht = p˜
oi
htζ
oi
ht where p˜
oi
ht is the true
price and poiht is the measured price. In this case the error has mean zero and:
var(ln ζoiht) = σ
2
cov
(
ln ζoiht, ln ζ
o′j
hs
)
= 0 ∀ o 6= o′, t 6= s, i 6= j
By assuming that the log of the geometric mean price of a variety is approximately equal to
the log of the arithmetic mean, it is possible to compute the variance of ln poht as follows:
σ2ln poht ≡ var
[
ln
(∑
i p
oi
ht
xoht
)]
≈ var
ln
(∏
i
poiht
)1/xoht =
=
1
(xoht)
2
var
(∑
i
(
ln p˜oiht + ln ζ
oi
ht
))
=
1
(xoht)
2
xohtσ
2 =
1
xoht
σ2.
Thanks to the assumptions on structure of the error, we obtain:
E(∆k ln poht)
2 = E
(
(ln poht − ln poht−1)− (ln pkht − ln pkht−1)
)2
=
= δ2hokt + σ
2
(
1
xoht
+
1
xoht−1
+
1
xkht
+
1
xkht−1
)
,
where δ2hokt is the variance of the true price differences over time and with respect to variety k.
Averaging this across all periods:
E
1
T
∑
t
(∆k ln poht)
2 =
1
T
∑
t
δ2hokt + σ
2 1
T
∑
t
(
1
xoht
+
1
xoht−1
+
1
xkht
+
1
xkht−1
)
.
is assumed to be equal to 140. All results are very robust to these assumptions, the choice of a max value of
sigma equal to 140 has no impact on the final result.
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This implies that the equation (B.9) should be modified by adding the following error adjust-
ment term to the right hand side:
(B.11) err_adj = θ̂3
1
T
∑
t
(
1
xoht
+
1
xoht−1
+
1
xkht
+
1
xkht−1
)
,
where θ̂3 = σ̂2 is a parameter to be estimated. This equation generalises Broda and Weinstein's
(2006) approach, which which does not take into account the first difference with respect to the
reference country k. Since prices of variety k might also be measured with error, our estimates
are likely to be more robust to measurement error if the choice of the reference country is
accounted for.
Broda and Weinstein (2006) use a similar line of reasoning for the weighting matrix of their
WLS estimator. Heteroskedasticity is likely to be present because if prices are measured with
error, so are their sample variances. They correct for this heteroskedasticity by assuming that
the sample variances are inversely related to the quantity of goods (used to calculate unit
values) and to the number of periods. We follow the same strategy, and define the variance in
order to account for the first differencing with respect to the reference country k. Hence the
weights are given by:
(B.12) weight = T 3/2
(
1
xoht
+
1
xoht−1
+
1
xkht
+
1
xkht−1
)−1/2
.
The elasticities will be estimated both following the Broda and Weinstein's (2006) baseline
estimation strategy and using the modified error adjustment term and weighting scheme.
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Figure 1: EU12 Imports by Origin, 1993-2013 
 
Notes: Figures shows EU12 imports by group of origin countries. “EU Accession” are the 2004/2007 
accession countries, “Other Europe” are Russia, Switzerland, Norway, Ukraine, Belarus, Austria, 
Sweden, Finland and Iceland, “post-93 FTAs” are the non-accession countries with which the EU has 
signed FTAs after 1993 (also see Table 1) and “Other” are all other countries. 
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Table 1: List of EU Free Trade Agreements, 1993-2013 
Partner country Year of 
Entry into 
Force  
EU Accession 
Date 
Partner 
country 
Year of Entry 
into Force 
EU Accession 
Date 
Cyprus 1973 2004 Israel 2000 -- 
Malta 1971 2004 Algeria 2006 -- 
Czech Republic 1995 2004 Egypt 2004 -- 
Slovakia 1995 2004 Jordan 2002 -- 
Estonia 1998 2004 Lebanon 2003 -- 
Latvia 1998 2004 Morocco 2000 -- 
Lithuania 1998 2004 Tunisia 1998 -- 
Hungary 1994 2004 Mexico 2000 -- 
Poland 1994 2004 South Africa 2000 -- 
Slovenia 1995 2004 Chile 2003 -- 
Bulgaria 1995 2007 South Korea 2011 -- 
Romania 1995 2007 Peru 2013 -- 
Turkey 1996 -- Columbia 2013 -- 
Faroe Islands 1997 -- Costa Rica 2013 -- 
Macedonia 2004 -- El Salvador 2013 -- 
Croatia 2005 2013 Guatemala 2013 -- 
Albania 2009 -- Honduras 2013 -- 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
2009 -- Nicaragua 2013 -- 
Montenegro 2010 -- Panama 2013 -- 
Serbia 2010 --    
  
Table 2: The Impact of FTAs on Prices, Quality and Variety: EU12, 1993-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
ln(priceoht) -
ln(priceoht-5) 
ln(qualityoht) -
ln(qualityoht-5) 
ln(qualityoht) -
ln(qualityoht-5) 
ln(varietyht) 
ln(adj.priceoht) -
ln(adj. priceoht-5) 
FTAot- FTAot-5 0.0002 0.0674*** 0.0884*** 0.00098 -0.0666*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0152) 
 
(0.0193) (0.00124) (0.0185) 
      
N 1,613,652 1,613,652 1,613,652 1,613,652 1,613,652 
R2 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.004 
Year FE, αt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Elasticity Estimates -- Section 3 BW Method -- Section 3 
Notes: Table shows results from OLS regressions (robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the origin 
country-year level). Quality in columns (2) and (3) is estimated using the elasticity estimates from Section 3 and 
estimates based on Broda and Weinstein’s (2008) methodology, respectively; both quality measures are adjusted 
for hidden varieties. Variety in column (4) refers to λjt/ λjt-1 from Section 2. Column (5) uses quality- and hidden-
variety adjusted prices. FTAt - FTAt-5 takes a value of 1 when there is an FTA in force between the EU12 and the 
trade partner in period t but not in period t-5, and 0 otherwise. The RHS contains year fixed effects throughout. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3: GDP Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
ln(priceoht)-ln(priceoht-5) 
ln(qualityoht)-
ln(qualityoht-5) 
ln(varietyht) 
FTAot- FTAot-5 -0.0048 0.0644*** 0.0009 
 (0.0119) (0.0145) (0.0013) 
ln(pcGDPot) – ln(pcGDPot-5) 0.1784*** 0.1065*** 0.0022** 
 (0.0152) (0.0191) (0.0011) 
    N 1,613,388 1,613,388 1,613,388 
R2 0.010 0.001 0.011 
Year FE, αt Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Table shows results from OLS regressions (robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the origin 
country-year level). See Table 2 and text for details. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
Table 4: Different Functional Forms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Two-Year Differences, 
ln(yoht)-ln(yoht-2) 
OLS with Product-Time Fixed 
Effects, ln(yoht) 
Single Two-Year Difference, 
ln(yoht)-ln(yoht-2) 
Single Five-Year Difference, 
ln(yoht)-ln(yoht-5) 
FTA price effect (SE) 0.000985 0.0524*** 0.00209 0.0198 
 (0.0131) (0.0165) (0.0173) (0.0222) 
FTA quality effect (SE) 0.0433*** 0.0839*** 0.0574*** 0.107*** 
 -0.0136 -0.0213 (0.0168) (0.0288) 
FTA variety effect (SE) -0.00125 -- -0.00233 -0.00490* 
 (0.00111)  (0.00144) (0.00251) 
     Time FE, αt Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Origin-product FE, αoh No Yes No No 
Definition FTA dummy FTAt- FTAt-2 FTAt FTAt- FTAt-2 FTAt- FTAt-5 
Notes: Table shows results for OLS regressions of the variable in the first column (y = price, quality, variety) on the FTA dummy in levels or changes. See the last row for the 
definition of the FTA dummy in each regression. The top row indicates the functional form of the dependent variable in each regression. Robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets below the coefficient estimates, clustered at the origin country-year level throughout. See Table 2 and text for details. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  
Table 5: Matched Control Group 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Five-Year Overlapping 
Differences, ln(yoht)-
ln(yoht-5) 
Five-Year Overlapping 
Differences, ln(yoht)-
ln(yoht-5) 
Five-Year Overlapping 
Differences, ln(yoht)-
ln(yoht-5) 
FTA price effect (SE) 0.0352 0.0263 0.0248 
 (0.0095)*** (0.0100)*** (0.0133)* 
FTA quality effect (SE) 0.1037 0.1092 0.1363 
 (0.0177)*** (0.0264)*** (0.0483)*** 
FTA variety effect (SE) -- -- -- 
    
    Definition FTA dummy FTAt- FTAt-5 FTAt- FTAt-5 FTAt- FTAt-5 
Matching Radius 0.20 0.10 0.05 
Notes: Table shows propensity score matching estimates for the effect of FTAs on the variables in the first 
column (y = price, quality, variety). Propensity scores are obtained from a logit regression of changes in the 
FTA dummy, FTAt - FTAt-5, on standard gravity variables (distance, contiguity, GDP). We use radius matching to 
choose a control group, imposing that matches need to be from the same product-year bin as the treated 
observation. Columns (1) - (3) report estimates for different choices of matching radius. Standard errors are 
obtained via cluster-bootstrapping (clusters at the origin country-year level). See text for details. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 6: Controlling for Hidden Varieties, Alternative Approaches 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
ln(qualoht) -
ln(qualoht-5) 
ln(qualoht) -
ln(qualoht-5) 
ln(qualoht) -
ln(qualoht-5) 
ln(qualoht) -
ln(qualoht-5) 
ln(qualoht) -
ln(qualoht-5) 
FTAot- FTAot-5 0.0774*** 0.102*** 0.0983*** 0.101*** 0.138* 
 (0.0178) (0.0197) (0.0195) (0.0192) (0.0799) 
      N 1,613,652 1,613,652 1,613,652 1,613,652 782,930 
R2 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.005 
Time FE, αt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Proxy for 
Hidden 
Varieties 
None Origin FE 
Origin x 1-
digit-HS FE 
Origin x 3-
digit-HS FE 
ln(# firmsoht) 
Notes: Table shows results from OLS regressions of the quality measures in the top row on the first-differenced 
FTA dummy, FTAt - FTAt-5 (robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the origin country-year level). The 
last row indicates how the quality measures are adjusted for “hidden” varieties. See text and Table 2 for 
details. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  
Table 7: Controlling for EC Status  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
ln(priceoht)-ln(priceoht-5) ln(qualityoht)-ln(qualityoht-5) ln(varietyht) 
FTAot - FTAot-5 0.00882 0.0712*** 0.000862 
 (0.0129) (0.0153) (0.00124) 
EUot - EUot-5 0.120*** 0.0517** -0.00166 
 (0.0147) (0.0233) (0.00124) 
    
N 1,613,652 1,613,652 1,613,652 
R2 0.009 0.001 0.011 
Time FE, αt yes yes yes 
Notes: Table shows results from OLS regressions of the measures in the top row on the first-differenced FTA 
dummy, FTAt - FTAt-5, and the first-differenced EU dummy, EUt - EUt-5 (robust standard errors in brackets, 
clustered at the origin country-year level). See text and Table 2 for details. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 8: The Effect of Tariffs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ln(priceoht)-
ln(priceoht-5) 
ln(qualityoht)-
ln(qualityoht-5) 
ln(varietyht) 
FTAot - FTAot-5 0.0171 0.0774*** 0.0006 
 (0.0136) (0.0148) (0.0012) 
Tariffoht – Tariffoht-5 0.00112* -0.00031 0.0005*** 
 (0.00066) (0.00084 (0.0001) 
    
N 1,177,343 1,177,343 1,177,343 
 
R2 0.008 0.001 0.012 
 Time FE, αt yes yes yes 
Notes: Table shows results from OLS regressions of the measures in the top row on a first-differenced FTA 
dummy and changes in import tariffs (robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the origin country-year 
level). Tarifft - Tarifft-5 is the percentage point change in effectively applied EU import tariffs at the HS 6-digit 
level between periods t-5 and t. See text and Table 2 for details. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Table 9: Pre-Trend Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ln(priceoht)-
ln(priceoht-5) 
ln(qualityoht)-
ln(qualityoht-5) 
ln(varietyht) 
FTAot+5- FTAot -0.00913 0.0101 0.00155 
 (0.0138) (0.0149) (0.000986) 
N 1,613,652 1,613,652 2,295,129 
R2 0.009 0.001 0.011 
Time FE, αt yes yes yes 
Notes: Table shows results from OLS regressions of the measures in the top row on a lead indicator for free 
trade agreements (robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the origin country-year level). FTAot+5- FTAot 
takes a value of one if origin country o implemented a free trade agreement within five years from period t, 
and zero otherwise. See text and Table 2 for details. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 10: Domestic Varieties 
 (1) (2) 
 
ln(varietyst) ln(varietyst) 
Exposurest 4.844 -1.642 
 (4.107) (2.450) 
N 2,268 2,268 
R2 0.051 0.955 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes 
Sector Fixed Effects no yes 
Notes: Table shows results from OLS regressions of the number of varieties on a measure of exposure to 
import competition (robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the 4-digit ISIC level). See text for details 
and variable definitions. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  
Table 11: Heterogeneity – EU and Partner Country Income Groups 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ln(priceoht) -ln(priceoht-5) 
ln(qualityoht) -
ln(qualityoht-5) 
ln(varietyht) 
Panel A: EU12 Income/Geographic Groups 
EU12 Low/South -0.0556*** 0.00303 0.00650** 
 (0.00866) (0.0127) (0.00255) 
EU12 Middle/Central -0.00676 0.0276*** 0.00254** 
 (0.00515) (0.00712) (0.00120) 
EU12 High/North -0.0175** 0.131*** 0.00372** 
 (0.00755) (0.0123) (0.00188) 
Panel B: Partner Countries by Income Groups 
Low and Lower-Middle 
Income FTA Partners 
-0.0259 0.0917*** 0.00349** 
(0.0180) (0.0195) (0.00165) 
Upper-Middle Income FTA 
Partners 
0.0563*** 0.109*** -0.00181 
(0.0159) (0.0239) (0.00231) 
High Income FTA Partners 
-0.00550 0.00890 -0.00142 
(0.0218) (0.0317) (0.00156) 
Panel C: Partner Countries by Agreement Type 
Future EU members 0.101*** 0.193*** -0.00360 
 (0.0137) (0.0316) (0.00288) 
Balkans 0.0299 0.172*** 0.0153*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0386) (0.00374) 
Euro Med -0.0709*** 0.0325 0.00203 
 (0.0184) (0.0214) (0.00178) 
Non-Regional 0.0362** 0.0572*** 0.0832*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0202) (0.0314) 
Year FE, αt Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Table shows results from OLS regressions of the measures in the top row on the first-differenced FTA 
dummy and year fixed effects for the subsamples indicated in the first column (robust standard errors in 
brackets, clustered at the origin country-year level). See text and Table 2 for details. 
  
Table 12: Heterogeneity – Results by ISIC Groups 
ISIC ISIC Group Name Prices Quality Variety No. Obs. 
  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE  
01_05 Products of agriculture, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture 0.0129 (0.0174) 0.0040 (0.0294) 0.0045 (0.0035) 93456 
10_14 Mining products 0.0172 (0.0416) -0.0026 (0.0876) 0.0016 (0.0101) 21060 
15_16 Food and Tobacco 0.0150 (0.0139) -0.0284 (0.0245) 0.0067* (0.0038) 126722 
17_19 Textiles 0.0199 (0.0148) 0.1079*** (0.0272) 0.0020 (0.0015) 368126 
20_22 Wood, paper, printing 0.0036 (0.0275) 0.0981*** (0.0286) -0.0021 (0.0027) 86410 
23_24 Coke and chemicals 0.0134 (0.0193) -0.0254 (0.0363) -0.0040* (0.0024) 200120 
25_26 Rubber and plastic 0.0128 (0.0191) 0.0655** (0.0280) -0.0033 (0.0020) 124954 
27_28 Metal products -0.0021 (0.0163) 0.0241 (0.0242) 0.0030 (0.0030) 191304 
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. -0.0911** (0.0377) 0.1573** (0.0710) 0.0002 (0.0024) 139626 
30_33 Machinery, equipment, television, instruments 0.0398 (0.0248) 0.1942*** (0.0667) -0.0015 (0.0011) 138363 
34_35 Motor vehicles, transport equipment -0.0059 (0.0521) 0.1265*** (0.0457) 0.0079 (0.0076) 43277 
36_37 Furniture; other manufactured goods n.e.c. -0.0117 (0.0324) 0.0116 (0.0360) 0.0053** (0.0027) 47660 
40_99 Services -0.0496 (0.1096) 0.1044 (0.1961) 0.0207 (0.0146) 3103 
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates and standard errors from regressions of prices, quality and variety indicators on the first-differenced FTA indicator and year fixed 
effects carried out separately for each ISIC group listed in the first column (robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the origin country-year level). See text and Table 
2 for details. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 13: Heterogeneity – Interaction Regressions 
  (1) dln(price) (2) dln(price) (3) dln(price) (4) dln(quality) (5) dln(quality) (6) dln(quality) 
dFTA 0.0202 0.220 -0.00274 0.0125 -0.355 -1.003*** 
 (0.0241) (0.166) (0.234) (0.0311) (0.259) (0.292) 
dFTAxHigh_EU 0.0235*  0.0188 0.0674***  0.0718*** 
 (0.0131)  (0.0134) (0.0217)  (0.0204) 
dFTAxMed_EU 0.0149  0.00996 0.0584***  0.0341* 
 (0.00998)  (0.0105) (0.0210)  (0.0202) 
dFTAxH_Partner 0.0309  0.0550** -0.0281  -0.0429 
 (0.0248)  (0.0265) (0.0314)  (0.0401) 
dFTAxUM_Partner 0.0265  0.00682 -0.118***  -0.0869*** 
 (0.0265)  (0.0207) (0.0325)  (0.0303) 
dFTAxFutureEU 0.0407  0.0167 0.102***  0.150** 
 (0.0283)  (0.0545) (0.0342)  (0.0743) 
dFTAxBalkans 0.0441  0.0268 0.0969***  0.179*** 
 (0.0388)  (0.0583) (0.0372)  (0.0649) 
dFTAxEuroMed -0.0906***  -0.123*** -0.0601**  -0.0245 
 (0.0249)  (0.0335) (0.0294)  (0.0558) 
dFTAxlog(distance)  5.76e-05 -0.00359  -0.0142 0.0348 
  (0.0106) (0.0202)  (0.0127) (0.0291) 
dFTAxCommon Language  -0.0578*** -0.0353**  -0.0608** -0.0581* 
  (0.0200) (0.0173)  (0.0295) (0.0318) 
dFTAxlog(share)  -0.0128*** -0.0137***  0.0107 0.0117 
  (0.00314) (0.00311)  (0.00844) (0.00898) 
dFTAxlog(time)  0.0162 0.0475*  -0.0524** -0.0403 
  (0.0174) (0.0263)  (0.0216) (0.0273) 
dFTAxlog(RCA Difference)  -0.0286** -0.00974  0.0626*** 0.0813*** 
  (0.0112) (0.0106)  (0.0184) (0.0161) 
Observations 4,741,033 4,741,033 4,741,033 4,741,033 4,741,033 4,741,033 
R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Notes: Table shows results of OLS interaction regressions using exporter-importer-HS 6-digit level data. Each of the regressors shown in the first column is interacted with 
the FTA dummy. The regression also includes year fixed effects and interaction terms between the FTA dummy and ISIC group dummies. Robust standard errors are in 
brackets, clustered at the origin country-year level. The excluded interaction category in columns (1), (3), (4) and (6) is Low Income EU – Low, Lower Middle Partner, Non 
Regional FTAs, ISIC 01_05. See Table 2 and text for details. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Table 14: Counterfactual Price Changes – Aggregate Estimates 
Aggregation Level Mean SD Min Max 
(1) HS 6d – Total -0.35% 0.71% -6.50% 0.30% 
- Price 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 
- Quality -0.35% 0.72% -6.52% 0.00% 
- Variety 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.31% 
(2) ISIC import price indices -0.42% 0.40% -1.64% -0.05% 
(3) ISIC domestic price indices -0.06% 0.05% -0.17% -0.01% 
(4) ISIC indices -0.14% 0.13% -0.61% -0.01% 
(5) Cumulative Price Index Effect, 1993-
2013 (95% CI) 
-0.24% [-0.19%, -0.28%] 
(6) Cumulative Price Index Effect, 1993-
2013, No Intermediates (95% CI) 
-0.13% [-0.10%, -0.15%] 
(7) Cumulative Price Index Effect, 1993-
2013 (95% CI), Int., BW Elasticities 
-0.30% [-0.23%, -0.36%] 
(8) Cumulative Price Index Effect, 1993-
2013 (95% CI), Int., Unido 
-0.49% [-0.42%, -0.56%] 
Notes: Table shows descriptive statistics for FTA-induced five-year changes in the subcomponents of the 
consumer price index from equation (2.8). Rows 5-8 show the cumulative effect over the sample period on the 
aggregate price index for different scenarios and coefficient estimates. The confidence intervals of the 
cumulative effects are computed using bootstrapped standard errors. See text for details. 
 
Table 15: Counterfactual Price Changes – Estimates Allowing for Heterogeneity 
Type of Estimate Heterogeneity 
Cumulative Price Index 
Effect, 1993-2013 
(95% CI) 
Cumulative Price Index 
Effect, 1993-2013, No 
Intermediates (95% CI) 
(1) ISIC-Level Estimates (Table 12) -0.27% [-0.07%, -0.47%] -0.18% [-0.07%, -0.29%] 
(2) EU Country Group Estimates (Table 11A)   
- Low (Greece, Spain, Portugal) -0.12% [-0.05%,-0.18%] -0.07% [-0.04%,-0.10%] 
- Middle (Denmark, Germany, France, 
Italy) 
-0.13% [-0.07%,-0.19%] -0.08% [-0.05%,-0.11%] 
- High (Ireland, UK, Netherlands) -0.41% [-0.34%,-0.48%] -0.27% [-0.23%,-0.31%] 
(3) Interaction Regressions (Table 13) -0.47% [-0.17%, -0.76%] -0.30% [-0.13%, -0.47%] 
Notes: Table shows the total cumulative effect on the consumer price index for the period 1993-2013. Figures 
in panels (1) and (3) are for the EU12 as a whole and figures in panel (2) for the country groups listed. All 
confidence intervals are computed using bootstrapped standard errors. See text for details. 
